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Abstract
This thesis consists of two chapters regarding the transmission of information in the
sovereign debt market. The first one looks into the signaling role of the choice of debt by the
sovereign and the second one focuses on a class of intermediaries in the market of sovereign
debt, the credit rating agencies, and examine the information consequences of their solicited
and unsolicited ratings.
In the first chapter I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity
to communicate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel
is active only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative
association between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and
fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I perform an empirical investigation
based on a panel of 58 OECD and emerging market economies since 1980 and find evidence
of this signaling channel.
The second chapter aims at contributing to the debate on whether unsolicited ratings
are strategically motivated. I present evidence from the sovereign debt market that strategic
motivation is not necessarily behind the patterns that we see in the data and propose a
model of credit ratings and ancillary services that abstracts from strategic considerations.
In my model, borrowers with different unobservable characteristics select themselves into
different solicitation groups. In equilibrium, the model can generate either a negative or a
positive selection on unsolicited ratings, depending on the share of unsolicited ratings in a
given market. The economic mechanism analyzed in this chapter implies a “natural” degree
of market selection which is not associated to strategic motivation.
i
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Chapter 1
The Signaling Role of Fiscal Austerity
1.1 Introduction
Austerity is at the forefront of the public policy debate following the European sovereign
debt crisis. It refers to a combination of measures that reduce a country’s deficit, hence, the
debt burden. Accordingly, most of the discussion about austerity measures revolved around
the issue of debt sustainability (ECB, 2012; StLouisFED, 2012). The starting point of the
present work is the observation that austerity may serve different purposes and need not be
undertaken only under an unsustainable budget. A number of countries engaging in sizeable
austerity after 2010 were indeed thought to be in the safe European “core.” For instance,
Germany announced plans to reduce its budget deficit by 80 billion euros by 2014. The UK
embarked on the biggest cuts in state spending since World War II, and the Netherlands
went through several austerity packages despite a low ratio of debt to GDP.1
Furthermore key policymakers believed that such measures may serve to reassure the mar-
kets about the country’s creditworthiness and help maintain access to international lending.
In the words of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “austerity measures are adopted in order
to send a very important signal,”2 or, as the British Chancellor of the Exchequer George
Osborne put it, “we have to convince the world that we can pay our way in the world.”3
In this paper, I investigate the role of fiscal austerity as a way to communicate a
sovereign’s ability to honor its debt obligations. Signaling is a channel through which
austerity may affect a country that has been overlooked in the past. As I argue below,
understanding the informationational motivation for undertaking fiscal tightening measures
may improve our understanding of the sovereign bond market and lead to new normative
1“EU austerity drive country by country,” BBC News, 21 May 2012.
2“Merkelettes’ Siren Song Sounds Very German,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 July 2011.
3“Sterling hits two-year low after Moody’s UK downgrade,” The Telegraph Investor, 25 February 2013.
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prescriptions.
I propose a model where countries differ in their ability to repay their sovereign debt.
Since this quality is unobservable, lenders cannot differentiate between different types of
countries, hence the motivation for signaling creditworthiness. A country’s type may reflect
the political preferences of citizens with respect to the trade-off between public spending
and debt repayment. For example, in Portugal, attempts to cut public wages and reform the
pension system faced harsh social protests and had to be abandoned4 whereas similar mea-
sures were successfully implemented in countries such as Italy and Spain. Broadly speaking,
a type can be associated to anything that implies a different level of total fiscal revenues for
the peak of the Laffer curve.
The economic mechanism I develop is similar to Spence’s signaling model of education,
where more able individuals also have a lower cost of getting educated and hence schooling
is used to convey information about ability.5 Since a creditworthy country has higher prob-
ability of repaying its debt it also has a higher expected future benefit in reducing debt. At
the same time - for any given price of debt - the present cost of a debt reduction is the same
across countries. The model, hence, enjoys a single-crossing property and admits a separat-
ing equilibrium featuring austerity for signaling purposes. In the separating equilibrium, the
more creditworthy country chooses to markedly reduce its debt so that to differentiate itself
from less able countries and enjoy a lower risk premium on sovereign debt. The model also
admits pooling equilibria where all countries receive the same price for unit of debt.
Instead of employing the more common ‘intuitive criterion’ of Cho and Kreps (1987),
to reduce the set of equilibria I employ the ‘undefeated equilibrium’ refinement proposed
by Mailath et al. (1993). The proposed refinement always selects the equilibria with the
highest welfare and it delivers the following interesting prediction, which I use in my empirical
analysis. In my model, the amount of public information available in the market uniquely
determines whether the prevailing equilibrium is separating or pooling. I model different
levels of public information by introducing a a credit rating agency that provides public
signals about country types. When the rating agency generates a weak signal, in the unique
equilibrium, the creditworthy countries find it profitable to undertake fiscal consolidation
for signaling purposes. In contrast, when the public signal provided by the agency is very
informative only pooling equilibria exist.
In the empirical section, I consider a panel of 58 countries since the 1980s and study how
the amount of public information provided by rating agencies is associated to changes in the
4“Portugal court rules public sector pay cut unconstitutional,” BBC News, 6 July 2012.
5More precisely, my model differs from Spence’s baseline framework in that the choice of debt also has
a direct effect to the ability to repay.
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structural deficit and other measures of a country’s fiscal austerity. I use two alternatives
proxies as indicators of the amount of public information about a country creditworthiness.
The cross-sectional correlation between the sovereign yields and the sovereign ratings is-
sued by the rating agency is an aggregate measure of the informativeness of the rating in
a given period. This first empirical exercise is based on the assumption that the overall
informativeness of the ratings affects an individual country incentives to signal but, being a
cross-country measure, it is not likely to be affected by the fiscal policy of a single country.
I find that a decrease in the cross-sectional correlation between sovereign yields and ratings
is associated to an abnormally high level of fiscal tightness, that is not explained by changes
in the fundamentals of the country.
The second indicator of the amount of information I use is a dummy variable capturing
large sovereign yield movements in a given rating category. In my model, an episode of
signaling is characterised by an increase in the yield differentials across country types. A
country that separates itself from the other ones in the same rating category enjoys a lower
cost of debt. I look at each rating category (for example, triple B sovereigns) and count the
episodes of drastic yield changes within a period of no change in the rating. I take this as
a measure of how likely it is that this category is in a separating equilibrium. Then I check
how the structural deficit changes in the other countries belonging to that category. Those
countries have not been subject to a yield nor a rating change, therefore reducing reverse
causality issues. The model predict that those countries should exert higher fiscal pressure
compared to the countries belonging to other rating categories where such drastic yield
changes have not occurred. In line with the theoretical predictions I find that a higher number
of drastic yields changes at constant rating is associated with higher fiscal consolidation in
the countries within the category with the exclusion of the ones experiencing the yield change
or a rating change. There is time variation within each category allowing me to have both
time and country fixed effects.
The coefficient is significantly different from zero after controlling for other variables that
are usually used in the literature estimating fiscal rules (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and
Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013) such as total debt over GDP, the amount of GDP and
GDP per capita and growth. Further robustness checks evaluate alternative hypotheses and
favor the signaling channel as the most compelling explanation of the evidence.
Literature review. The conduct of fiscal policy has traditionally been envisioned as a way
to distribute resources optimally across periods in order to maximise social welfare (Barro,
1979), or - more recently - in order to achieve more office-oriented or short-sighted goals (e.g.,
Persson and Tabellini (1999)). This paper studies an alternative channel through which the
presence of information asymmetries might also lead to fiscal policies that deviate from the
3
first best.
A few other works consider incomplete information in a model of sovereign debt (Cole
et al., 1995; Sandleris, 2008; Drudi and Prati, 2000; Fostel et al., 2013; D’Erasmo, 2008).
None of them has addressed the problem at hand: the signaling role of fiscal policy.
Sandleris (2008) and Dellas and Niepelt (2014) use the absence of a default as a signalling
device. Differently from them, I use fiscal consolidation as a signal. In another section of
their paper, Dellas and Niepelt (2014) have a model where signaling is done through real
(over)investment; hence the signaling activity is compatible both with a reduction and an
increase in debt. In my model, the signaling activity is always associated with a fiscal
consolidation.
There is a large body of literature that estimates fiscal rules (Gali and Perotti, 2003;
Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013) and study the main variables behind
fiscal policy changes. This paper contributes to this literature by introducing the signaling
motivation to fiscal policy changes. Other papers have studied exclusively the change of
informativeness of the credit ratings (Partnoy, 2006; Kiff et al., 2012; Bussiere and Ristiniemi,
2012; De Santis, 2012). None of them links those changes in informativeness to austerity
measures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the model and in Sec-
tion 1.3 I characterize the equilibrium set. Sovereign credit ratings are introduced in Sec-
tion 1.4.1, while Section 1.4.2 extends the model to multiple periods. Section 1.5 is devoted
to the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 concludes.
1.2 Model
Consider a two-period small open economy where a sovereign borrower issues debt to foreign
lenders in order to maximize its citizens welfare.6 The sovereign country has limited com-
mitment, defaulting whenever it is unable to fully repay its debt. Depending on its ability
to repay, the sovereign can be of two types, indexed by i ∈ {A,B} with probability p and
1− p respectively. Foreign lenders do not know what type of borrower the country is.
Lenders’ problem. Lenders are risk-neutral. They lend the amount qD2 in period 1 to the
sovereign, where q is the price of debt in period 1. If there is no default, they receive D2 in
6In the model, sovereign debt is equivalent to external debt. Domestic debt does not play any role in
this model because the government has enough instruments to allocate consumption intertemporally for its
citizens.
4
period 2. In case of default, there is no partial repayment. The lender profit function is:
Π = −qD2 + β′D2[1− λ(D2, µ)], (1.2.1)
where β′ is the lenders’ discount factor, µ the probability that the borrower is of type A and
λ(D,µ) = [µλ(D, 1) + (1− µ)λ(D, 0)] represents the expected sovereign’s default probability
at (D,µ) and will be precisely defined below. Lenders compete a` la Bertrand over lending
conditions driving profits to zero. As a result, the equilibrium price function satisfies:
q(D2, µ) = β
′[1− λ(D2, µ)]. (1.2.2)
The sovereign debt price responds to the amount of debt issued and the lenders’ belief about
creditworthiness. The higher the price is, the more advantageous are the borrowing terms
for the sovereign.
Sovereign’s problem. The problem solved by the sovereign government is to maximise
citizens’ expected discounted utility c1 + βE[c2], where β is the discount factor. The repre-
sentative citizen has endowment ω1 in period 1, and a random endowment ω2 in period 2,
which is drawn from an exponential distribution f(ω2) with support [ω,∞), hazard rate h
and cumulative function F (ω2).
7 Given the initial level of debt D1, the sovereign government
chooses the debt level D2 and taxes T1, T2 to satisfy the government budget.
Each country, of type i = A,B, that repays its debt satisfies the following constraints:
ct ≤ ωt − Tt, for t = 1, 2; (1.2.3)
T1 ≥ D1 − q(D2, µ)D2 and T2 ≥ D2. (1.2.4)
ct ≥ ci for t = 1, 2. (1.2.5)
Constraint (1.2.3) is the budget constraint of the respective citizens. Constraints (1.2.4)
represent the government budget constraint in t = 1, 2. The initial level of debt D1 is
exogenous and D3 = 0 since in the last period debt cannot be rolled over. It is easy to
see that both (1.2.3) and (1.2.4) will be satisfied with equality. Hence, once the choice
of D2 is taken, taxes and consumption in t = 1 are fully pinned down under repayment.
Constraint (1.2.5) introduces heterogeneity in the ability to pay across countries. It states
that the sovereign government must guarantee to its citizens a consumption level of ci every
period. Differences in the guaranteed level of consumption are the only source of ex-ante
heterogeneity across countries.
7The exponential function f(ω) = he−hω features a constant hazard rate, which is helpful in order to
obtain the same level of equilibrium debt for both types under full information.
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I assume
cA < cB. (A1)
Constraint (1.2.5), together with the budget constraint (1.2.3), imposes a cap on the
ability to tax. Since cB is higher than cA, country B is less able to repay the outstanding
debt than country A for the same level of income. Stated differently, ceteris paribus, country
B is less creditworthy.
In order to always guarantee the existence of a feasible allocation I also assume the
following
ω ≥ cB. (A2)
I assume away strategic default. Since ω2 ∈ [ω,∞), in the first period, a country will
never default. Default will occur in period 2 for ω2 ≤ D2+ci. If the second period endowment
realization does not suffice to cover both the commitments versus foreign lenders and the
domestic commitments on citizens’ required consumption, the country defaults on its debt.
Otherwise the country complies with its commitment. The probability of default for country
i = A,B, with debt level D2 is hence F (D2 + c
i).
Our analysis will be confined to the range of parameters that satisfy
cB >
ω1 −D1 + β′ω
1 + β′
. (A3)
This condition rules out the uninteresting case in which the two types have zero probability
of default.8 By assumption (A1), F (D2 +c
A) ≤ F (D2 +cB)∀D2 and, by (A3), the inequality
is strict. For any given debt level, a type A country is less prone to default. This predispo-
sition to default is driven by unobservable fundamentals of the country - ci - but the type
that actually defaults depends on the equilibrium choices and, ultimately, the endowment
realization.
In case of default, the citizens consumption is assumed to be ci and the lenders do not
receive any repayment. The difference between the endowment realization and consumption
after default, ω2 − ci, is a deadweight loss. Finally, I assume
β′ > β · 1− F (D2 + c
A)
1− F (D2 + cB) = β · e
h(cB−cA). (A4)
Thanks to the exponential assumption, we can state this condition as a function of exogenous
8The maximum level of debt that allows country B to be risk free in the second period is D2 = ω − cB .
Assume that this level (or a lower one) would be unfeasible in the first period at the risk-free price β′:
cB > ω1 −D1 + β′(ω − cB), or reformulated, cB ≥ ω1−D1+β
′ω
1+β′ . Assumptions (A3) and (A2) are compatible
as long as ω ≥ ω1 −D1.
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parameters. Since eh(c
B−cA) > 1, it implies that the discount factor abroad β′ is higher than
the domestic discount factor β by a wedge that is high enough to compensate for the difference
in risk premia across types. External lenders are willing to finance a type B sovereign at a
rate that is attractive domestically for both types. This makes a sovereign country willing
to increase period 1 consumption and finance it by issuing new debt.9 What remains to
be determined is how much new debt the country wants to issue, once it internalizes that
issuing debt changes the relative price of debt versus repayment. And this choice can be
made contingent on the type.
Single crossing. Combining the previous ingredients, the discounted expected utility of
sovereign i is:
U i(q,D2) := ω1 −D1 + qD2 (1.2.6)
+ β
[
F (D2 + c
i)ci +
(
1− F (D2 + ci)
) (
E[ω2|ω2 ≥ D2 + ci]−D2
)]
.
The first line of the right-hand side represents the citizens’ consumption in the first period:
the endowment ω1 plus the net borrowing of the period. The second line represents the
expectation of consumption in period 2 discounted by β: with probability F (D2 + c
i), the
country defaults and consumption is ci, and with the complementary probability, consump-
tion is the result of the endowment, noticing that ω2 can only be a realization compatible
with repayment, minus the debt outstanding. Expression (1.2.6) can be used to define the
indifference curves in the space of two key variables (D2, q). Those indifference curves are
represented in figure 1.1 for the two types of countries.
As explained below, for all D2, the slope of type B’s indifference curves in (D2, q) is
steeper than that of type A. A decrease from D2 to D
′
2, as depicted in figure 1.1, needs
to be compensated with an increase from q to q′A for type A and from q to q
′
B for type B.
This implies that any two curves of A and B can cross at most once in the space (D2, q).
The reason behind it is that default occurs when a country cannot afford repayment and, as
this depends only on solvency, B can do it more often.10 Hence, a type B country benefits
more from debt because it anticipates that it has to pay back less. A formal proof of the
single-crossing property can be found in Appendix 1.7.1.
9I choose to motivate the willingness to issue debt by making international credit relatively cheap do-
mestically. Other authors achieve the same result with different assumptions: for example, assuming the
government has to finance an investment project that pays in the future (Sandleris, 2008) or that office-
motivated politicians like debt (Acharya and Rajan, 2011).
10Note that the penalty for default is higher for type A, cA−ω2−D2 < cB −ω2−D2 ∀D2. However, the
single crossing property does not require heterogeneous penalty across types. The penalty could be made
equal, provided it is not high enough to prevent any default, and type B would still default in more states
than A because default is not strategic.
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Figure 1.1: Single crossing property of the preferences.
1.3 Equilibrium analysis
1.3.1 Full information
As a benchmark, let us describe the equilibrium of the model when the type of the country
is observable. The full information equilibrium allocation is a price and a debt level for each
type. In this case, the lenders know type i’s probability of default for each level of debt and
charge the actuarially fair price qi(D2) = β
′ [1− F (D2 + ci)]. The sovereign faces the price
schedule qi(D2) and maximises the discounted expected utility (equation (1.2.6)):
max
D2
ω1 −D1 + qiD2 + β
[
F (D2 + c
i)ci +
(
1− F (D2 + ci)
) [
E(ω2|ω2 ≥ D2 + ci)−D2
]]
(1.3.1)
subject to qi(D2) = β
′ [1− F (D2 + ci)] .
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to D2 is the following:
∂qi(D2)
∂D2
D2 + q
i(D2)− β
(
1− F (D2 + ci)
)
= 0. (1.3.2)
The first term in (1.3.2) represents the change in cost that every inframarginal unit of debt
experiences when an additional unit is issued. The second term is the gain from bringing
consumption to the present at the current price qi(D2). Finally, the third term represents
the cost of the repayment promise: each unit of debt will be repaid in the next period only
if there is no default, which happens with probability 1− F (D2 + ci).
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Substituting the price schedule qi(D2) in the FOC, after some transformations, we ob-
tain:11
Di2 =
β′ − β
β′
[
F ′(Di2 + c
i)
1− F (Di2 + ci)
]−1
. (1.3.3)
And, recalling that h is the hazard rate of the endowment exponential distribution f(·),
equation (1.3.3) simplifies to:
DA2 = D
B
2 =
β′ − β
β′h
. (1.3.4)
The expression (1.3.4) is the optimal level of debt under full information. Call the full
information equilibrium debt level DFI2 . D
FI
2 is positive because of assumption (A4). It
means that the country issues a positive amount of debt in order to take advantage of
the favourable lending conditions. Despite DFI2 is the same for both types, in equilibrium,
different types face a different price. Price is lower for type B because this type defaults
more than the other, so its debt carries a higher risk premium:
qB(DFI2 ) = β
′ [1− F (DFI2 + cB)]
< β′
[
1− F (DFI2 + cA)] = qA(DFI2 ).
1.3.2 Incomplete information
Consider a game where the type of sovereign is unobservable. Nature draws a type A with
probability p. A sovereign knows its type and chooses how much debt to issue, balancing
the benefits of increasing present consumption and the probability of future default. The
sovereign also takes into account that its choice of debt may reveal information about its
type to the uninformed lenders and, therefore, influence their pricing decisions.
The country’s strategy is a choice of debt D∗2. The lenders’ strategy is a price function
that depends on the observedD∗2 as well as the lenders’ beliefs about the type of the sovereign.
The adopted solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies.
Definition 1.3.1. A symmetric PBE in pure strategies is a set of strategies for the sovereign
and the lenders,
D∗2 : {A,B} → R
q∗ : R× [0, 1]→ R+
11See Appendix 1.7.2 for the proof.
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and a system of beliefs µ∗ : R→ [0, 1] on the country being of type A, such that:
• For i = A,B, D∗2(i) maximises expected utility U i given the lenders’ strategy q∗(·).
• q∗(·) is consistent with zero expected profits: q∗(D2, µ∗) = β′[1− λ(D2, µ∗)] ∀D2, µ.
• The system of beliefs µ∗(D2) is consistent with Bayes’ rule and the equilibrium strategies
whenever possible. That gives the following equilibrium beliefs function.
– Let 1{·} be the indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition in curly
brackets holds and zero otherwise.
– If p1{D∗2(A)=D2} + (1− p)1{D∗2(B)=D2} 6= 0 then:
µ∗(D2) =
p1{D∗2(A)=D2}
p1{D∗2(A)=D2} + (1− p)1{D∗2(B)=D2}
,
– If p1{D∗2(A)=D2} + (1− p)1{D∗2(B)=D2} = 0, then µ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Separating equilibria. An equilibrium is separating when a sovereign chooses a different
debt level depending on its type. Let the equilibrium outcome be the vector of debt levels
and prices denoted by {D∗2(i), q∗(i)}i∈{A,B}.
A type A country obtains debt at better market conditions because it is less prone to
default. Hence, a type B sovereign might have an incentive to pretend to be of type A
in order to improve its borrowing terms. To this end, it might choose to mimic type A’s
strategy. Hence, the relevant incentive compatibility constraint is type B’s,
UB (D∗2(B), q
∗(B)) ≥ UB (D∗2(A), q∗(A)) . (1.3.5)
Proposition 1.3.1. There exists a separating equilibrium outcome
(D∗2(A), q
∗(A)) , (D∗2(B), q
∗(B)), where D∗(B) = DFI2 , q
∗(B) = β′
[
1− F (D∗2(B) + cB)
]
,
D∗(A) = D−B2 is the level that satisfies (1.3.5) with equality and q
∗(A) =
β′
[
1− F (D∗2(A) + cA)
]
. This is supported by the equilibrium beliefs µ∗(D∗2(A)) = 1
and µ∗(D2) = 0 for D2 6= D∗2(A).
Proof. Appendix 1.7.3.
The allocation (D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)), represented in figure 1.2, is preferred by A to any other
allocation under the price represented by the dotted bold line. At the same time, B is
indifferent between that allocation and (DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)) by definition.
12 The intuition is
12Its incentive compatibility constraint (1.3.5) is satisfied with equality.
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Figure 1.2: Separating equilibrium e∗.
that A’s isoutility curves in the space (D2, q) are flatter than B’s. Type A is willing to
accept a larger debt reduction for a given change in the price of debt. It, therefore, finds
attractive allocations that are not attractive to B.
Type A chooses (D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)) while B chooses its full information allocation D
FI
2 .
No type has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. But choosing a different allocation than
DFI2 is costly for A as well. The larger the deviation, the higher the cost for A. Since D
−B
2
is the threshold debt level that allows separation of the types, the equilibrium e∗ described
in proposition 1.3.1 is the least cost separating equilibrium.
In a separating equilibrium, type A’s equilibrium choice of debt is lower than that of the
full information solution (D−B2 −DFI2 < 0). We say that the country is using austerity for
signaling purposes. The choice of a lower level of debt improves the debt price schedule,
lowering the risk premium associated to each D2. Summing up, reducing the amount of debt
to the D−B2 level has a double effect: it directly improves the risk premium, because it lowers
the default probability, and it indirectly affects the perception of the type, which improves
the risk premium further. If it were not for the indirect effect, though, type A would not
choose to go through with austerity.13 Hence, signaling is the key for fiscal policy to tilt
toward austerity.
Pooling equilibria. A pooling equilibrium arises if type A does not find it advantageous to
reduce the amount of debt in order to obtain the benefits from revealing its type. It consists
of an equilibrium debt level D∗2 and a price of debt q
∗(D∗2, p), equal for both types. As a
result, the lenders cannot distinguish the types from observing their debt choices and their
13The direct effect is present at the full information problem as well and type A chooses to issue more
debt in equilibrium.
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best guess is the prior p. For example:
Proposition 1.3.2. A pooling equilibrium at the full information allocation is supported by
the belief system µ∗(DFI2 ) = p and µ
∗(D2) = 0 for D2 6= DFI2 . The price of debt in a pooling
equilibrium equals
q∗(DFI2 , p) = β
′ (p [1− F (DFI2 + cA)]+ (1− p) [1− F (DFI2 + cB)]) . (1.3.6)
Proof. Appendix 1.7.4.
See figure 1.3, where the price schedule is again represented by the dotted bold line.
The off-equilibrium threat that a country will be penalised in its risk premium if it deviates
from DFI2 might allow a pooling equilibrium to be sustained at the candidate D
FI
2 . Any
type of sovereign prefers to choose DFI2 and be offered the pooling price under these beliefs.
Beliefs are admissible because in equilibrium the pooling price satisfies Bayes’ rule and off-
equilibrium they are free to be any µ ∈ [0, 1].14
Figure 1.3: A pooling equilibrium at DFI2 .
1.3.3 Refinements
A signaling game, like the one presented here, typically admits a multiplicity of equilibria.
This is because a large set of off-equilibrium beliefs is consistent with the equilibrium defi-
14They are set to µ = 0 in this case.
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nition, making it easier to sustain a given equilibrium. In my model, proposition 1.3.1 and
proposition 1.3.2 are examples of different equilibria that may coexist. To reduce the set of
equilibria, I use a refinement of the PBE introduced by Mailath et al. (1993): the undefeated
equilibrium (UE).
The UE refinement restricts the set of admissible off-equilibrium beliefs. Beliefs about
a deviation to a different allocation are admissible if the probability distribution over types
is consistent with such types choosing that allocation in another equilibrium and being
weakly better off by doing so. Otherwise, off-equilibrium beliefs are inconsistent. If this off-
equilibrium consistency requirement restricts beliefs in such a way that they do not sustain
a given equilibrium, this equilibrium is defeated and we say that it does not survive the
refinement.15 An equilibrium is defined to be undefeated if it is not defeated by any other.
Unlike dominance-based refinements,16 the UE refinement focuses on the efficiency prop-
erties of the equilibrium. The consistency of an off-equilibrium strategy is evaluated on the
basis of which type(s) is weakly better off in an alternative equilibrium where this strat-
egy is chosen. In any pooling equilibrium, a sovereign chooses a given D2 irrespective of
its type. For this equilibrium to be undefeated any type must be better off choosing that
allocation compared to deviating to different equilibrium strategy. Thus, the UE privileges
the equilibria that are efficient in a Pareto sense.
Proposition 1.3.3. Applying the UE refinement to the game, equilibria of the separating
and the pooling class cannot coexist. For a sufficiently small p there is a unique separating
equilibrium where type A chooses D−B2 , otherwise there are pooling equilibria with D2 > D
−B
2 .
As stated in the proposition, for p < p¯, the unique equilibrium of the problem is e∗,
where p¯ is the threshold level of the prior that makes type A indifferent between the signaling
allocation
(
D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)
)
and pooling with type B at (D∗2, q(D
∗
2, p¯)). The line of proof
goes as follows: first, notice that the least costly separating equilibrium e∗ defeats any other
separating equilibrium. All separating equilibria reveal the type of the sovereign but e∗ does
it with the smallest deviation from the full information allocation for type A. Hence, type A
is strictly better off at e∗. This means that off-equilibrium beliefs at D−B2 must be µ = 1 for
any other separating equilibrium but those beliefs do not sustain an equilibrium at D2 6= D−B2
because such an equilibrium would be defeated by e∗. Furthermore, e∗ defeats any pooling
equilibrium if type A is better off signaling (that is, for p < p¯). When choosing D−B2 gives
type A a higher utility, this cannot be ignored off equilibrium in any pooling equilibrium
and thus it is inconsistent if A does not realize it would be better off deviating to D−B2 . The
15See appendix 1.7.5 for a formal definition of the UE refinement.
16Notably the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) and divinity by Banks and Sobel (1987).
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pooling equilibrium is, therefore, defeated. In this case, e∗ is the unique equilibrium of the
model. A formal proof is presented in appendix 1.7.6.
If p ≥ p¯ then both types are better off pooling, thus e∗ is defeated by a pooling equilib-
rium. The proof is presented in appendix 1.7.7. The UE refinement allows pooling equilibria
to survive.17 Pooling e′ survives if there is no other pooling equilibrium in which both types
are better off. Hence, undefeated pooling can be sustained at any allocation in the range
[D∗A2 , D
∗B
2 ], where D
∗A
2 is the allocation preferred by type A under schedule q(·, p) and D∗B2 is
the one preferred by type B. Pooling equilibria in allocations outside that range are defeated
by other pooling equilibria within that range because they are strictly preferred by both
types. Within this range moving closer to one type’s preferred allocation means moving
further from the other; hence, types cannot both be made better off.
Restating the result of proposition 1.3.3, a separating equilibrium will exist depending
on the beliefs about the creditworthiness of a country. A small p reflects a prior that the
country is most likely of type B, thus providing large incentives for a type A to signal and
separate itself from the uninformed pool. As p becomes larger, ex-ante beliefs of the lenders
about creditworthiness are more optimistic, and both types are satisfied foregoing austerity
because the potential price benefits of signaling would not be large. Once both types prefer
to pool, the least preferred separating equilibrium is defeated and only pooling equilibria
exist.
1.4 Public information and multiple-periods
1.4.1 Credit rating
In the model, signaling depends on the belief distribution over types: if lenders believe
the sovereign’s creditworthiness is most likely high, a country does not gain much from
17Note that with the ‘intuitive criterion’ (Cho and Kreps, 1987), the separating equilibrium always elim-
inates all pooling equilibria and it remains the unique equilibrium in this kind of signaling game with two
players and single crossing preferences. According to it, if a deviation from a candidate equilibrium is dom-
inated for one type but not for another, this deviation should not be attributed to the type for which the
deviation is dominated. Hence, no pooling equilibrium can dominate the separating equilibrium e∗ because
the single crossing property creates a space between the indifference curves such that any D2 to the left of the
pooling allocation would be preferred only for type A and not for B. At every such D2 beliefs must be such
that µ = 1 and those off-equilibrium beliefs cannot sustain a candidate pooling equilibrium. The intuitive
criterion fixes an equilibrium (e.g. e′) and then restricts the off-equilibrium beliefs that are inconsistent with
the dominated choices for each agent based on that equilibrium e′. Similarly, the UE fixes an equilibrium e′
but the off-equilibrium beliefs at D2 are restricted looking at another equilibrium where this allocation D2
is an equilibrium allocation. Restrictions are established based on consistency with the type(s) that would
choose D2 in the new equilibrium, only if the type(s) are better off than at the fixed equilibrium e
′. So the
allocations that dominate the pooling allocation in the intuitive criterion do not exist in the UE because
they are not equilibrium strategies of an alternative equilibrium. As a consequence, pooling can survive.
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implementing costly austerity to improve the market’s perception. Thus, it is useful to
explore how changes in the lender’s views on creditworthiness affect austerity.
A Credit Rating Agency (CRA) issues sovereign ratings: they are opinions on the credit
standing of a country. Credit ratings affect how the public perceives the creditworthiness
of the country. I model a sovereign rating as a public signal: r ∈ {r¯, r}. The rating is im-
perfectly informative about the country’s creditworthiness and the degree of informativeness
is captured by a parameter ρ. ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the CRA detects a type B
country and assigns a low rating r: Prob (r | B). Country B receives a low rating r with
probability ρ and, with probability 1 − ρ, it receives a high rating r¯. A type A country
always receives a high rating.
Once ratings are assigned, the debt market is segmented into different markets conditional
on the rating. A low rating perfectly reveals a B type and the country rated r is removed from
the complementary market r¯. Hence, the rating ameliorates the asymmetry of information
but does not eliminate it completely. The residual asymmetry of information depends on
ρ.18 The empirical literature on credit ratings finds robust evidence that the ratings add
information on average, measuring the impact that either ratings or new announcements have
on the market (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Lee et al., 2010; Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007). In
addition, some papers note that this impact changes over time (Kiff et al., 2012; De Santis,
2012) and that the explanatory power of the ratings diminishes in times of crisis (Bussiere
and Ristiniemi, 2012).
I concentrate my analysis on the r¯ category for the remainder of this paper.19 Recall from
proposition (1.3.3) that the existence of an equilibrium with ‘signaling austerity’ depends on
the proportion of types p. The parameter ρ, by modifying the proportion of types in each
segmented market, affects the determination of the equilibrium. The posterior pˆ(ρ) is:
pˆ(ρ, r) =

p
1−ρ(1−p) if r = r¯
0 if r = r.
(1.4.1)
If ρ is set to 1, the CRA provides perfect information about the type of country and the
solution is the full information one. If, instead, ρ = 0, we are in the baseline model with
18ρ can take on different values, ∈ (0, 1), for a number of reasons that are not explicitly modelled here: for
example, a conflict of interest due to the issuer-pays model of rating fees would be represented as a decrease
in ρ, as we go from an investors-pay to an issuer-pays model. Similarly, either the difficulties of rating an
increasingly complex set of products or the lack of attention paid to sovereigns that do not pay for their
ratings would also imply a decrease in the parameter ρ.
19That is because the r category reveals a type B country with certainty and, thus, is of no interest for
signalling. Alternatively I could model the r rating to be imperfectly informative as well. As the analysis is
analogous to that of the r¯ category, I opt for this simplified information structure of the signal.
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asymmetry of information from the previous section. For values between 0 and 1, the degree
of informativeness affects to a lesser or greater extent the beliefs about the composition
of types in the rating category r¯ and, thus, the equilibrium debt price of pooling in that
category, which equals:
q∗(D∗2, p, ρ | r¯) = β′
[
p
1− ρ(1− p)
(
1− F (D∗2 + cA)
)
+
(1− ρ)(1− p)
1− ρ(1− p)
(
1− F (D∗2 + cB)
)]
.
Price is increasing in the prior about creditworthiness - p - and in the ratings capacity to
improve the prior with new information - ρ. Both p and ρ make the lenders more optimistic
about creditworthiness (weighting up the beliefs that they are in front of a type A country
and down the beliefs that it is type B instead).
Let e∗ be the least cost separating equilibrium defined in proposition 1.3.1 and p¯ be the
threshold level of the prior that makes type A indifferent between signaling and pooling as
described in the previous section.
Proposition 1.4.1. If the prior p is such that p < p¯, there exists a level of informativeness
ρ∗ of the rating so that for all ρ ≥ ρ∗ all equilibria are pooling and for ρ < ρ∗ the unique
equilibrium is e∗.
Proof. Since the equilibrium for p is e∗, it follows that type A must prefer e∗’s equilibrium
allocation to the pooling one:
UA
(
D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)
)
> UA (D∗2(p), q(D
∗
2(p), p))
= UA (D∗2(pˆ), q(D
∗
2(pˆ), pˆ)) if ρ=0. (1.4.2)
The last line exploits the fact that the two problems without ratings and with ratings that
add no information are the same. The left-hand side of (1.4.2) is independent of ρ, while
the right-hand side is increasing in ρ because ∂pˆ
∂ρ
|r¯> 0. And for ρ = 1− , with  very small,
the right-hand side tends to UA
(
DFI2 , q
A(DFI2 )
)
and the inequality is reversed. Hence, there
must exist a threshold ρ∗ where the equilibrium shifts from a pooling one to e∗.
Thus,
Corollary 1.4.1. A deterioration of ratings informativeness from ρ ≥ ρ∗ to ρ < ρ∗ makes
‘signaling austerity’ appear.
A worse posterior pˆ(ρ) about the sovereign’s ability means that more type B countries
are perceived to be in the r¯ category and the pooling price is lower for every level of debt.
Price schedule q(D2, pˆ) shifts downwards as in the transition from figure 1.4a to figure 1.4b.
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(a) Equilibrium with ρ ≥ ρ∗. (b) Equilibrium with ρ < ρ∗.
Figure 1.4: A change in ρ induces a shift from a pooling (left panel) to a separating (right
panel) equilibrium.
If a pooling equilibrium exists, it will be on the new schedule. But, when ρ < ρ∗, any of
the allocations on this schedule is worse off for A than the separating allocation, defeating
pooling equilibria. To sum up, a worse perception of the r¯-rated category makes it less
attractive for A to pool with the others, because the pooling price is low, and revealing the
type compensates the cost of austerity.
Think about a situation where the informativeness of the ratings was presumably high,
like before the 2008 financial crisis. Ratings are believed to be very informative and the
markets take them at face value and react strongly to them. The prediction of the model
is that all types of sovereigns would likely find it advantageous to pool at a high debt level.
They do not have an incentive to signal through costly austerity in order to overcome the
little residual asymmetry of information. However, if the informativeness of the ratings
plummets, for instance when the reputation of the rating agencies came into question after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the equilibrium may shift to a separating equilibrium. In
this new scenario, corollary 1.4.1 tells us to expect ‘signaling austerity’ as countries benefit
from standing out as creditworthy. The effects of signaling will show in the price of debt,
which becomes more responsive to the fiscal magnitudes than before. In that way, you can
rationalize the surge in austerity in the European core countries in the aftermath of the
crisis and the increase in the Euro area sovereign spreads. In the next section, I simulate
the model for a number of periods and compare it with the time series data.
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1.4.2 A simple multiple-period model with iid shocks to the type
In this section, I extend the model to multiple periods. There are two cases in which this
extension can be done without excessive complications: the case with constant types over
time and the case with iid shocks to the type. With constant types, once there is a separating
equilibrium, the type is fully revealed. From then onward, each country chooses its optimal
amount of debt under perfect information. Signaling, hence, takes place at most once.
With independent shocks to the type, the problem changes in the following way: at the
end of period t a new type is drawn, cit+1. Then, the income realization ωt is obtained and
the country may default. After a default, there is immediate re-entry in the debt market
and the country can borrow again Dt+1.
The solution to any two consecutive periods t and t + 1 is the same as that of the
previous two-period game.20 The reason is that the current realization of the type carries
no information about the type in the future and, thanks to the linear preferences and the
absence of a dynamic punishment for default, the optimal level of debt is independent from
the past stock of debt.
I simulate this economy during T = 28 to compare it with the last 28 years of data.
The parameters of the model are the following: the lender’s discount factor is normalized
to be β′ = 1; the sovereign’s discount factor is β = 0.6, lower than the lender’s to satisfy
assumption (A4); the minimum consumption in a type A country is normalized to cA = 0;
while in a type B country it is higher at cB = 1. The lower bound of the support of the
income distribution is ω = 1, which satisfies assumption (A2) with equality. The coefficient
of the exponential distribution of income h is set to 1, so the mean income is also 1. D1−ω1
is set to 0 without loss of generality. Finally, the probability of being type A is set to be
30%.
I assume that the probability that the CRA detects a type B country, ρ, is a parameter
that becomes known at the beginning of each period. I find the equilibrium of the model for
every value of ρ in a grid between [0, 1] and calculate the correlation between debt prices and
sovereign ratings as a function of ρ. I choose the value of ρt that minimizes the difference
between the simulated correlation and the correlation in the data each period.
Figure 1.5b depicts austerity in the data in the bars, measured as the sum of the pri-
mary balance of the government budgets over GDP weighted by the number of countries in
each period.21 The solid line plots the cross-section correlation between sovereign yields and
sovereign ratings for the same sample of countries between 1985 and 2012. The two vari-
ables have a negative co-movement: a high correlation between sovereign ratings and yields
20See appendix 1.7.8 for a proof.
21The sample is described in section 1.5.1 and can be found in appendix 1.7.9.
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(a) Simulated data. (b) Actual data.
Figure 1.5: Negative co-movement between correlation and austerity.
happens with little or no austerity while a low correlation is associated with bar spikes in
austerity. Figure 1.5a plots the choice of ρt (dotted line), the cross-sectional correlation (solid
line) and the aggregate debt change implied by the model (bars). I am able to replicate the
negative co-movement that we see in the data.
Let us now focus on the evolution of sovereign yields over time. Figure 1.6 depicts the
same bars as before for the aggregate debt change, together with the simulated sovereign
bond yields of each country type. A period of separating equilibrium, characterized by
austerity, corresponds to the troughs in the bars. At those times, the sovereign yields of
the two country types diverge and a positive spread appears between sovereigns in the same
rating category. The prediction associated with a pooling equilibrium is the opposite: the
debt bars spike and the spread disappears.
The two empirical regularities that emerge in this simple multiple-period model - the
negative co-movement between the sovereign yields-ratings correlation and austerity and the
changes in yields dispersion with austerity - are used in the empirical analysis in the next
section.
1.5 Empirical analysis
In this section I go beyond the aggregate data from the previous section and examine indi-
vidual countries over three decades in a panel regression analysis. A given country’s choice
of fiscal policy is determined by a number of different variables that the literature has identi-
fied (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013). For instance,
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Figure 1.6: Simulated sovereign yields.
the stock of debt matters for debt sustainability and might affect how much austerity a coun-
try engages in. In order to distinguish between how much austerity results from signaling
motives, I look at the evolution of austerity that is associated with changes in the incentives
to signal, conditional on fundamentals.
Incentives to signal are measured in two ways. The first measure I use is the cross-section
correlation between sovereign yields and sovereign ratings in a given period. This variable
proxies the market assessment of the ratings’ information. According to Corollary 1.4.1, the
less information there is (low ρ) the more likely is a surge in austerity. This, controlling for
other determinants of the fiscal stance. I now explain how the ratings’ information is related
to the correlation variable in my model. Recall that Prob(r|B) = ρ and Prob(r|A) = 0 and,
in the setup with two ratings, it represents the information that the rating conveys to the
market. Since Cantor and Packer (1996), a large body of literature investigates the market
impact of credit ratings by regressing the sovereign yields, spreads and other measures of the
market value on the sovereign ratings.22 Following the literature, I estimate the equation:
Sovereign Yieldi,t = ρtRatingi,t + i,t,
using cross-sectional variation. Hence, ρˆt = corrt(Sovereign Yieldt,Ratingt) is an estimate
of the changes in public information that the sovereign ratings convey over time. Each year,
the correlation reflects the extent to which the sovereign yields charged by the lenders to all
sovereigns are explained by the order in which they are placed in the rating scale. A larger
22Possibly controlling for an array of covariates.
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correlation is presumed to mean a high ρ while a lower one implies a low ρ. This is what I
also find in the simulation of the multiple-period economy in section 1.4.2 (see figure 1.5a).
An alternative way to identify austerity is to measure if market spreads are dispersing
within a given rating category. As shown in figure 1.6, increased dispersion in yields inside
a category is indicative of low informativeness of the ratings and should prompt austerity in
the separating equilibrium for that group of countries vis-a`-vis the other groups. I look for
extreme events in the yields of a sovereign within the yields distribution by rating category
in the data: the variable Yield Eventi,k,t represents the events in country i belonging to
the rating category k in year t and takes value 1 if a large change happened and 0 if not.
Rating categories are defined more coarsely than the rating grades in order to obtain a
larger number of countries in each category.23 I define a yield event as extreme when the
difference in demeaned log yields between two consecutive years is larger than two standard
deviations of the log yields distribution in that year for that rating category.24 Demeaning
allows me to remove the time trend in the time series of yields. I use log yields because the
interpretation of differences in log yields as percentage changes is useful and more realistic. In
appendix 1.7.10, I present the list of countries experiencing such events. Finally, I aggregate
the number of events by rating category at every point in time, excluding those affecting
country j itself:
Yield Shocksj,k,t =
∑
i∈k,i6=j
Yield Eventsi,k,t. (1.5.1)
I obtain an indicator variable that takes a higher value when more countries in j’s rating
category have price movements at the extremes of the distribution. My empirical strategy
then includes these variables that proxy for the willingness to signal - the Correlation or the
Yield Shocks - as a regressor ρˆit in an equation of the fiscal stance:
Austerityit = α + βρˆit + λXit + ξit (1.5.2)
and let βˆ capture the effect that changes in these variables have on austerity, beyond what
can be explained by other variables included as controls in Xit.
Austerity is also proxied by two different variables, depending on the specification, as
summarized in table 1.1. The first is an indicator variable measuring whether a given country
was under a consolidation program. This is determined according to the narrative approach
23The rating categories are: ‘Prime’ for ratings between AAA and AAA-included, ‘Subprime’ for ratings
between Aa1+ and Aa3- included, ‘Investment’ between A1+ and Baa3- and ‘Non-investment’ lower or equal
to Ba1+.
24This is robust to small changes in the threshold of standard deviations.
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by Devries et al. (2011) and the sample goes from 1978 to 2009 for 17 countries. The
second proxy for austerity is a continuous variable for the cyclically adjusted primary balance
(CAPB). It is defined as ‘general government balance adjusted for nonstructural elements
beyond the economic cycle’ and data covers 58 countries from 1980 to 2011 and is taken
from the WEO database.
Table 1.1 recaps the main empirical specifications of equation (1.5.2) for different mea-
sures of austerity (consolidation dummy/ CAPB) and the market assessment of the ratings’
information (correlation between yields and ratings/ yield shocks). In the table I also report
the expected sign of the coefficient according to the implications of the model in section 1.4.2.
Table 1.1: Main empirical specifications and expected sign.
Independent variable:
MARKET ASSESSMENT
RATINGS’ INFORMATION
Correlation Yield Shocks
Dependent
variable:
AUSTERITY
Consolidation
dummy
negative positive
Cyclically adjusted
primary balance
negative positive
1.5.1 Dataset and description of the variables
The dataset contains observations at annual frequency for 58 countries over 32 years (1980–
2011). Countries covered principally include OECD countries, as well as a selection of
emerging market economies. For a complete list of countries and the range of years covered
see appendix 1.7.9. The economic variables included in the dataset are obtained from the
World Economic Outlook (IMF) 2013; the definitions and calculation methods are found
in appendix 1.7.11. These include the following fiscal variables: Net lending/ borrowing,
Primary surplus/ deficit, CAPB, and Government expenditure. Positive values of these
variables - except expenditure - mean that the government is saving and negative values
indicate that it is borrowing. Hence, increased fiscal austerity is represented by a positive
change in savings/ deficit or a negative change in expenditure.
The dataset has been merged with the average yield to maturity in percentage points of
long-term government bonds collected by the IMF in its International Financial Statistics
and with the data on fiscal consolidations programs by Devries et al. (2011). Finally, I
obtained historical data on sovereign ratings by the three biggest rating agencies (Moody’s,
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) for my sample of countries. The rating grades (e.g. AAA)
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were transformed into a numerical variable. I assigned each rating and modulation of the
rating (outlook/ rating watch) a number on a scale ranging from 0 (default) to 52 (maximum
grade). The final Rating variable was obtained taking an annual average of the three ratings
(if available). Since each sampled country received an initial sovereign rating at different
points in time, the resulting panel is unbalanced.25
1.5.2 Evidence on ‘signaling austerity’
Results using the Correlation as the independent variable
The results presented below correspond to the first column of the specifications in table 1.1:
ρt is proxied with the correlation variable throughout this section.
First, I use the consolidation episodes as a measure of austerity and I estimate equa-
tion (1.5.2) by probit:
Consolidation i,t = α + βcCorrt + λXi,t−1 + κi + τt + i,t,
where Consolidationi,t is a dummy variable from Devries et al. (2011), that takes the value 1
if the country fiscally consolidates in that year and 0 if it does not; Corrt is the correlation
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variable estimating ρt; and Xi,t−1 are one-period-lagged control variables (Net lending over
GDP, Squared primary surplus, Debt over GDP, Squared debt over GDP, Log fiscal GDP,
Log GDP per capita and Growth). The specification includes country and year fixed effects.
The coefficient βˆc = −13.5 in table 1.2 is statistically different from zero. A lower correla-
tion variable has a positive effect on the probability that the country is fiscally consolidating,
as expected.
I also estimate equation (1.5.2), letting primary deficit be the measure of austerity, using
OLS:
CAPBi,t = α + βdCorrt + λXi,t−1 + κi + i,t. (1.5.3)
The link from Corrt to CAPBi,t is hardly endogenous because the correlation is an
aggregate measure. One country’s austerity, CAPBi,t, might affect its yields, which enter
the calculation of the correlation. But this variable is a measure of the relation between all
yields and all ratings in the sample, hence reverse causality from a given country’s austerity
25However, there is no reason to believe that the initial observations for the non-rated countries are not
randomly missing.
26Correlations are calculated using the Spearman method to preserve the order of the ratings without
imposing a linear scale. Results from calculations using the Person correlation are also are available upon
request.
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Table 1.2: Panel probit
Consolidation dummy
Correlation -13.54**
(6.558)
Net lendingt−1 -0.295***
(0.0569)
Primary surplus2t−1 -0.0156*
(0.00879)
Debtt−1 -0.0129
(0.0280)
Debt2t−1 0.000175
(0.000108)
Log GDPt−1 3.669**
(1.653)
Log GDPpct−1 -2.859
(2.853)
Growtht−1 -4.587
(6.625)
Country FE Yes
Time FE Yes
N 369
Chi-square 102.1
Loglikelihood -137.2
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.3: OLS with robust standard er-
rors
CAPB
Correlation -1.809**
(0.805)
CAPBt−1 0.758***
(0.0461)
Primary surplus2t−1 0.000165
(0.00152)
Debtt−1 0.0575***
(0.0136)
Debt2t−1 -0.000190***
(0.0000569)
Log GDPt−1 -1.055
(0.919)
Log GDPpct−1 1.267
(2.155)
Growtht−1 1.992
(3.557)
Country FE Yes
Time FE No
N 607
R-square 0.821
F 51.84
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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CAPBi,t to the global Corrt is unlikely. As can be seen in table 1.3, the estimated coefficient
βˆd is negative and significant. The effect of a 1 point decrease in the correlation implies a
1.8 percentage points increase in cyclically adjusted primary surplus over GDP. Since the
correlation is normalized to lie in the interval [0, 1], this increase in austerity is difficult to
interpret; hence, I use one standard deviation in the distribution of the Corrt variable as a
benchmark. Such a change would be responsible for a quarter percentage point change in
the structural deficit.
Robustness
I performed a series of robustness checks in order to assess whether results are consistent
through changes in some measures and specifications. First, I discuss the choice about
the measures of austerity. As mentioned in the introduction, there is no clear consensus
about the definition of austerity but the one I propose in this paper27 requires measuring the
discretionary fiscal decisions made by the government . I opted for the narrative approach, in
which Devries et al. (2011) identify episodes of fiscal consolidations through “policymakers’
intentions and actions as described in contemporaneous policy documents.” Their focus
is on fiscal actions motivated primarily by deficit reduction as a response to past economic
conditions. Hence this measure, by construction, is particularly well-suited for the analysis of
discretionary fiscal policy. I also show an alternative proxy for austerity, based on a statistical
measure, such as the CAPB. This is the most commonly used aggregate of discretionary fiscal
policy. One might wonder, though, whether other fiscal variables are also in line with the
results. I present three in table 1.4. Results are consistent with those in the previous section.
The Corr variable co-moves negatively with austerity, represented by larger surpluses and
lower expenditures. Coefficients are larger than that of CAPB: a change in Corr of one
standard deviation is associated with up to 0.48pp in austerity.
I then consider additional specifications in order to control for reverse causality. I replaced
the Corrt by the correlation calculated over a random subsample of half the countries (J) in
the sample and estimate the following regression for the other countries:
Yi,t = α + βCorr
J
t + γXi,t−1 + κi + i,t ∀i /∈ J. (1.5.4)
by OLS. In (1.5.4) the fiscal position Yi,t cannot affect Corr
J
t as a consequence of the com-
putation method because the correlation is calculated for a different subsample. Table 1.5
shows that the effect found in the previous regressions still holds.
27A lower debt choice than that of the full information solution due to the signaling motive (see the
definition of ‘austerity for signaling purposes’ on page 11).
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Table 1.4: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus Expenditure
Correlation -3.562*** -2.913*** 3.260***
(0.883) (0.839) (0.786)
Net lendingt−1 0.740***
(0.0503)
Primary surplust−1 0.723***
(0.0485)
Expendituret−1 0.757***
(0.0409)
Primary surplus2t−1 0.00717 0.00653 -0.00580
(0.00474) (0.00452) (0.00560)
Debtt−1 0.0893*** 0.112*** -0.0649***
(0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0155)
Debt2t−1 -0.000358*** -0.000448*** 0.000267***
(0.0000742) (0.0000775) (0.0000704)
Log GDPt−1 -0.929 -1.818** 0.328
(0.784) (0.826) (0.777)
Log GDPpct−1 1.825 2.712 -0.696
(2.150) (2.155) (2.199)
Growtht−1 13.55*** 12.28*** -10.59***
(4.189) (4.095) (4.002)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 741 740 741
r2 0.764 0.730 0.960
F 38.72 32.82 862.2
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: OLS with robust standard errors
Consolidation Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
CorrelationJ -1.745** -2.566** -3.492*** -1.547* 1.628*
(0.827) (1.041) (1.007) (0.874) (0.937)
Net lendingt−1 0.672***
(0.0693)
Primary surplust−1 0.572***
(0.0908)
CAPBt−1 0.729***
(0.0791)
Expendituret−1 0.797***
(0.0478)
Primary surplus2t−1 0.000522 -0.000698 -0.00694 0.00208
(0.00556) (0.00501) (0.00775) (0.00610)
Debtt−1 0.0541** 0.0505* 0.0713*** 0.0446** -0.0352
(0.0215) (0.0286) (0.0266) (0.0185) (0.0238)
Debt2t−1 -0.000102 -0.000147 -0.000268* -0.000122 0.0000570
(0.0000956) (0.000156) (0.000149) (0.0000827) (0.000126)
Log GDPt−1 1.460 0.316 -0.222 -0.660 -1.673**
(1.019) (0.960) (0.979) (1.184) (0.838)
Log GDPpct−1 -6.899** -1.976 -0.510 0.0944 5.574**
(2.781) (2.812) (2.816) (2.883) (2.457)
Growtht−1 -2.230 2.894 3.120 1.181 0.0566
(5.927) (5.141) (5.269) (5.891) (4.130)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 217 465 464 286 465
r2 0.632 0.664 0.802 0.961
F 30.60 29.08 49.22 1123.1
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Next, I instrument Corrt in (1.5.3) with two instruments: the annual stock prices of the
company Moody’s and the number of negative news about the CRAs. Moody’s is one of
the big rating agencies and it is quoted in the stock exchange since 1998 (ticker: MCO). I
retrieved information on its stock prices (yearly averages) from Bloomberg. I also collected
the number of news counts in major distribution newspapers (in English) that contain a
negative view of the rating agencies from the LexisNexis database.28
The first underlying assumption is that Moody’s stock price reflects the ability of the
agency to assign informative ratings. The second assumption is that the opinion of experts
and the media on the rating agencies’ ability is informative. The relevance of these variables
to explain the Corrt can further be assessed by looking at the results of the first stage
instrumental variables regression in the table in appendix 1.7.12. On the other hand, neither
Moody’s stock price nor the critical opinions about the rating agencies should directly affect
any given country’s willingness to implement austerity; it should only affect this willingness
indirectly through the effect they have on the correlation via the signaling channel. In
table 1.6 results are confirmed for several austerity measures and the magnitude of the effect
is larger than in the previous estimations.
Further, I also exploit the time-series dimension of the data by substituting Corrt with
its one period lag. Since the correlation at t − 1 is predetermined when looking at it from
the current period, it cannot be affected by the austerity that takes place at period t. Xi,t−1
contains the lagged dependent variables (Net lending, Primary surplus, CAPB, Expenditure),
Debt over GDP, Squared debt over GDP, Log fiscal GDP, Log GDP per capita and Growth.
In order to deal with possible error autocorrelation, regression (1.5.3) has been estimated
using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.29 The Corrt−1 is instrumented with further lags
of the same variable. As reported in table 1.7, there is no autocorrelation left in the residuals.
I also apply the correction for small samples. Results in table 1.7 confirm the previous ones
and are significant. Robust estimators are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.
Results using the Yield Shocks as the independent variable
Here I present the results of the estimation corresponding to the specifications in the second
column of table 1.1. The independent variable in this section is the Yield Shocks. The
28Search key words were ‘rating agencies, reputation, accuracy & criticism’, ‘rating agencies, credibility
& mistake or error or blame’, ‘rating agencies, reputation & regulation’ and an example article would be:
‘Rating agencies: Capable or culpable?’, Euromoney November 2007.
29The Arellano-Bond estimator in differences uses first differentiation to eliminate the autocorrelated fixed
component of the error term.
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Table 1.6: IV regression results
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Correlationt−1 -18.49*** -18.04*** -4.092* 14.44***
(3.377) (3.790) (2.418) (2.928)
Net lendingt−1 0.504***
(0.0387)
Primary surplust−1 0.534***
(0.0393)
CAPBt−1 0.630***
(0.0382)
Expendituret−1 0.542***
(0.0385)
Debtt−1 0.0674*** 0.110*** 0.0515*** -0.0514***
(0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0137) (0.0170)
Debt2t−1 -0.0000956 -0.000231** -0.0000983 0.0000908
(0.0000927) (0.0000957) (0.0000624) (0.0000806)
Log GDPt−1 -0.799 -2.040*** -1.800*** 0.0419
(0.728) (0.747) (0.495) (0.632)
Log GDPpct−1 5.418*** 7.459*** 1.602 -0.421
(1.768) (2.227) (1.377) (1.522)
Growtht−1 4.943 1.958 2.564 -3.265
(3.914) (4.471) (2.899) (3.396)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 611 541 513 611
R-square 0.726 0.722 0.807 0.955
F 27.98 25.93 40.55 212.9
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: GMM with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Correlationt−1 -4.788*** -4.454*** -2.573*** 3.789***
(1.108) (1.321) (0.879) (0.827)
Net lendingt−1 0.507***
(0.101)
Primary surplust−1 0.461***
(0.134)
CAPBt−1 0.722***
(0.115)
Expendituret−1 0.648***
(0.118)
Debtt−1 0.220 0.236*** 0.227*** -0.285**
(0.146) (0.0818) (0.0834) (0.128)
Debt2t−1 -0.000475 -0.000616 -0.000863 0.00115
(0.000807) (0.000557) (0.000517) (0.000809)
Log GDPt−1 -3.842 -3.769 1.166 3.236
(6.798) (6.656) (4.499) (4.879)
Log GDPpct−1 11.55 8.179 -2.572 -9.088
(19.05) (17.80) (11.63) (13.65)
Growtht−1 25.82*** 29.90*** 8.965** -15.47*
(8.767) (7.788) (3.898) (8.596)
N 821 718 659 821
hansen 48.61 43.15 36.46 48.79
AR(1) 0.00182 0.0150 0.00634 0.00302
AR(2) 0.0466 0.0457 0.115 0.112
F 26.07 21.37 26.85 26.19
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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following specification:
Yj,k,t = α + γdYield Shocksj,k,t−1 + λXj,t−1 + κj + τt + uj,t, (1.5.5)
estimates how the number of extreme yield events in a rating category affects the fiscal
position of the countries in that rating category in the next period.
Table 1.8: Panel probit
Consolidation dummy
Yield shocks 0.389*
(0.211)
Net lendingt−1 -0.306***
(0.0527)
Primary surplus2t−1 -0.0112
(0.00907)
Debtt−1 0.0152
(0.0208)
Debt2t−1 0.0000294
(0.000102)
Log GDPt−1 2.066
(1.262)
Log GDPpct−1 -7.147**
(3.216)
Growtht−1 11.91**
(6.070)
Country FE Yes
N 335
Chi-square 83.58
Loglikelihood -130.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note that the definition of Yield Shocks in equation (1.5.1) does not include country j’s
own yields events; it contains only information about other countries in the same rating
category. Moreover, in order to be more careful, the independent variable is lagged one
period. Finally, I also exclude from the estimation those countries experiencing a yield event
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Table 1.9: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Yield shockst−1 0.533*** 0.601*** 0.294** -0.247**
(0.154) (0.166) (0.116) (0.118)
Net lendingt−1 0.684***
(0.0416)
Primary surplust−1 0.738***
(0.0412)
CAPBt−1 0.725***
(0.0521)
Expendituret−1 0.762***
(0.0299)
Debtt−1 -0.00823 0.0000688 -0.00352 0.0120**
(0.00580) (0.00586) (0.00532) (0.00552)
Log GDPt−1 -1.467** -1.981*** -2.267** 1.089*
(0.682) (0.727) (0.963) (0.640)
Log GDPpct−1 0.714 2.430 3.098* 1.329
(1.466) (1.640) (1.823) (1.361)
Growtht−1 5.198 0.501 5.121 -4.315
(3.792) (4.170) (6.206) (3.534)
Ratingt−1 -0.0837** -0.0776* -0.0684* 0.0418
(0.0372) (0.0431) (0.0380) (0.0341)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 885 772 653 885
r2 0.838 0.831 0.870 0.978
F 45.85 40.75 99.59 783.4
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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or a rating change between t− 1 and t. The objective is that the yield shocks are exogenous
to the countries’ fiscal position Yj,k,t and the effect on austerity comes from the change in
information alone. Xj,t includes the usual controls and the lagged ratings.
30
The regression results for this specification are presented in tables 1.8 (independent vari-
able: consolidation dummy) and 1.9 (independent variables: net lending, primary surplus,
CAPB, expenditure). Note that when more countries in your rating category are subject to
a yield event, it means a larger number in the variable Yield Shocks i,k,t. Hence, an increase
in the explanatory variable is associated with more austerity (an increase in the probability
of a fiscal consolidation, γˆc > 0, or higher values in the primary surplus, γˆd > 0) as expected.
This approach confirms the results from previous sections. Experiencing a yield shock in
your rating category increases the austerity over GDP on the order of one half percentage
points of net borrowing or primary deficit and about one quarter of CAPB. For example,
the primary deficit over GDP would go from 3.5% to 3%.
1.5.3 Alternative explanations
There could be alternative theories explaining the empirical results. I list a selection and
discuss them in this section.
First, in order to rule out that austerity is due to criteria of budget sustainability, I control
in all above regressions for a set of individual characteristics that the literature identifies as
important (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013) and
the results all survive.
However, there might still be missing unobservable characteristics. This is a problem
insofar the omitted variable is correlated with Corrt. Suppose that we are estimating this
regression:
Yi,t = α + βCorrt + γXi,t−1 + κi + i,t, (1.5.6)
where in reality i,t = Zt + ui,t and Corr(Xi,t−1, Zt) 6= 0. Then, Corr(Xi,t−1, i,t) 6= 0 and
estimation by OLS would produce biased coefficients. Concerns about omitted variables,
e.g. global uncertainty, are addressed by including country and time fixed effects in the last
specification (1.5.5). The effect of changes in information on austerity remains after the
omitted variables are controlled for.
There could also be omitted variables that affect only some countries and not others.
Particularly problematic is the case when an omitted variable affects the countries in some
particular category only. In this case the effects could be confounded with the effects of the
30In order to control for any other domestic reason that affects the fiscal stance.
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yield events operating at the level of the rating category and we would be unsure whether
we were capturing the correct effect. For example, think about precautionary savings by
countries within a rating category triggered by uncertainty clustered at the category level.
Note, though, that the precautionary motive should be homogenous in all countries within
a given category. But austerity by category shows high dispersion. This indicates that
austerity is not implemented by every country, as would be consistent with the precautionary
motive, but only by some countries that belong in the category affected by a price change,
as consistent with the signaling motive.
The results obtained here could also be attributed to contagion. A shock to a country is
transmitted to others, even if they are not directly hit. By the nature of contagion, it cannot
be captured by controlling for the fundamentals of the country as I did before. In order to
detect contagion among countries, the literature usually relies on price co-movements, thus
implying that contagion should matter-of-factly show in the price of debt. Controlling for
the country’s own lagged log yields and the lagged rating in specification (1.5.5), as I do in
appendix 1.7.13, I still find an effect of changes in the ratings information content.
One issue that remains is that we cannot predict what each type does because types are
not observable (neither in theory nor in the data). But we can work around that in the fol-
lowing ways: one is to use regional sub-samples. I repeat the same regression (1.5.2) on the
sample split by regions (OECD countries, European Union countries, peripheral European
countries and emerging market economies). The effect of a decrease in the correlation is
qualitatively the same, however, it becomes less significant for the group of peripheral coun-
tries and it is not significant for emerging markets (see appendix 1.7.14 for further details).
According to the model, this would be expected if there were a higher proportion of type B
countries in these two groups relative to the OECD and EU groups.
Another way is to use a two-stage strategy. In a first stage, I find the proximity to being
a ‘good type’ based on past observable information, where ‘good’ is defined tautologically as
those countries overshooting austerity from that predicted by the fitted regression (1.5.5).
In the second stage I can use the predicted proximity to good type/ austerian to explain the
CAPB. It turns out that the more the observable variables predict a country to behave as
a ‘good’ type in a certain year, the higher its out of sample austerity really is (coefficient:
1.201, standard deviation: 0.177).31
31The first stage regression uses years 1980 to 2000 and the out of sample prediction 2000 to 2011.
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1.6 Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper I show that a sovereign may use fiscal policy as a signal to communicate its
ability to repay public debt. In the empirical analysis I find that sovereigns adopt a more
austere fiscal policy when the credit ratings are less informative about a country creditwor-
thiness. This result is robust to different empirical strategies, specifications and measures of
austerity. The evidence favors the signaling channel over other alternative explanations.
The findings in this paper are relevant for policymakers wishing to implement austerity
programs in order to reduce the risk of a sovereign default. For instance, during the recent
debt crisis several European countries adopted a common debt ceiling.32 In my model this
policy is equivalent to setting an exogenous debt limit that is the same for any country
type. The introduction of a debt limit may make the optimal choice of debt unfeasible
if it is stringent enough. Hence, it triggers a change in the equilibrium that prevails. If
the undefeated equilibrium is separating, both countries are worse off because they cannot
choose their constrained optimal debt level and the incentive compatibility constraint of the
less able country is harder to satisfy. If the undefeated equilibrium is pooling, instead, both
types are still worse off, otherwise they could have chosen to pool at that debt level in the
unrestricted set-up. In some cases, as in the example in appendix 1.7.15, the overall riskiness
of debt increases. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ austerity program, such as the Fiscal Compact, may
backfire when countries are trying to signal with austerity.33
32The Fiscal Compact introduced the rule of fiscal budget balance in its Article 3 of Title II.
33In a different set-up with homogeneous countries and limited commitment, introducing a debt ceiling
could instead be useful to overcome the commitment problem.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 The single crossing property
The single crossing condition of indifference curves is defined as a ranking of the slopes of the
indifference curves U i(D2, q) such that ∆
A(D2, q) < ∆
B(D2, q) for all D2, q in the relevant
range, where ∆i(D2, q) := −
∂Ui(D2,q)
∂D2
∂Ui(D2,q)
∂q
. Let us show that the indifference curves of country
type A are flatter than those of country type B. First, let us define the relevant range of D2.
Let Di2 be the threshold level of debt that satisfies constraint (1.2.5) for t = 1 for each type:
Di2 =
ci − ω1 +D1
β′
[
1− F (Di2 + ci)
] . (1.7.1)
Substituting F (·) for its functional form, we obtain:
Di2 =
ci − ω1 +D1
β′
eh(c
i−ω)ehD
i
2 . (1.7.2)
Since ehD
i
2 is bounded between 0 and 1, Di2 > 0. Moreover, since c
A < cB, DA2 < D
B
2 . Thus,
the relevant range of D2 is [D
B
2 ,∞).
Next, let us compute ∆i(D2, q) for each type. Total differentiation of equation (1.2.6)
gives:
0 = D2 · dq+
+
[
q + βF ′(D2 + ci)ci − βF ′(D2 + ci)(D2 + ci) + βF ′(D2 + ci)D2 − β
(
1− F (D2 + ci)
)] · dD2
and, simplifying,
0 = D2 · dq +
[
q − β (1− F (D2 + ci))] · dD2.
Therefore, ∆i(D2, q) = − q−β(1−F (D2+c
i))
D2
and ∆A(D2, q) < ∆
B(D2, q) if ∆
i(D2, q) < 0, which
is the case for all D2 ∈ [DB2 , 0) given assumption (A4).
36
1.7.2 Full information optimal allocation
Let us show that the optimal level of debt under full information DFI2 is a local maximum.
Differentiating the FOC (1.3.2) with respect to D2 and rearranging gives:
F ′′
(
D2 + c
i
) [−β′D2 − β′ F ′ (D2 + ci)
F ′′ (D2 + ci)
+ (β′ − β)h−1
]
. (1.7.3)
In order to sign the previous expression, substitute F (ω) for its functional form 1− e−hω−ω.
F ′′(ω) < 0 and for equation (1.7.3) to be negative it must be that
−β′D2 − β′ F
′ (D2 + ci)
F ′′ (D2 + ci)
+ (β′ − β)h−1 > 0,
therefore,
D2 <
β′ − β
β′h
+
1
h
. (1.7.4)
The derivative of the FOC is negative when (1.7.4) holds. Since DFI2 =
β′−β
β′h and h > 0, the
expression (1.7.3) is negative at DFI2 and D
FI
2 is a local maximum.
1.7.3 Separating equilibrium
We show that the allocation
[(
D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)
)
,
(
DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)
)]
, along with beliefs µ∗
(
D−B2
)
=
1, and µ∗ (D2) = 0 for D2 6= D−B2 , constitutes a separating equilibrium outcome. Recall that
D−B2 is the debt level that satisfies type B’s incentive compatibility constraint (1.3.5) with
equality:
UB(D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)) = U
B(DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)). (1.7.5)
Let DA,B2 be the debt level most preferred by type A under the price schedule q(D2, 0).
Now let us define qi(D2, U) as the indirect function that gives the price of debt necessary
to keep type i’s utility constant at U for a given debt D2. qi(·) is continuous and one-to-one.
If U¯ = UB(DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)) is the utility level of country B in the full information equilibrium,
qB(D
FI
2 , U¯) is equal to the price q(D
FI
2 , 0) by definition. On the other hand, we know that
q(D2, 0) < q(D2, 1) ∀D2 and, in particular, for DFI2 . Therefore,
qB(D
FI
2 , U¯) = q(D
FI
2 , 0) < q(D
FI
2 , 1).
Hence, qB(D
FI
2 , U¯) lies below q(D
FI
2 , 1). Now let us check how these two functions behave
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to the left of DFI2 :
q(DB2 , 1) = β
′ [1− F (DB2 + cA)]
is positive and bounded and limD2→DB2 qB(D2, U¯) = +∞.
In the limit qB(D2, U¯) is above q(D2, 1). Since q(., 1) is continuous in D2 and so is
qB(D2, U¯) for D2 6= 0, qB(D2, U¯) and q(D2, 1) must intersect at some D2 between DB2 and
DFI2 . Hence, there exists a D
−B
2 ∈ [DB2 , DFI2 ] such that the isoutility curve of B going through(
DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)
)
crosses the price schedule q(D2, 1).
It remains to be proven that type A prefers choosing D−B2 and having the price of
debt q(D−B2 , 1) to choosing D
A,B
2 and having the price q(D
A,B
2 , 0). First, note that the
full information allocation is optimal for type B, hence, it is its highest isoutility curve under
the q(D2, 0) schedule. It follows that the price schedule q(D2, 0) must lie below B’s isoutility
curve going through the full information allocation for all D2 6= DFI2 . So, in order to satisfy
the tangency condition of DA,B2 for type A, the allocation (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) must be below
the isoutility curve of B going through (DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)). And, given that the isoutility curves
of A in (D2, q) are steeper than those of B for any D2, the two can only cross to the right
of DA,B2 . Since they cannot cross to the left of D
A,B
2 it is impossible that (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0))
is on a higher isoutility curve of A than (D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)). Otherwise, it would be preferred
by B as well and that is a contradiction to (1.7.5).
1.7.4 Pooling equilibrium at DFI2
In order to show that there can be a pooling equilibrium at the full information debt level,
note that B’s utility level pooling at (DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) must be higher than the full informa-
tion allocation (DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 0)) because the debt level is the same but the price is better.
Since µ∗(D2) = 0 for any D2 6= DFI2 , type B’s optimal choice of D∗2(B) is DFI2 . At the same
time, A’s utility at (DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) also needs to be higher than at its preferred allocation
under the q(D2, 0) schedule, (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)). By contradiction, for (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) to
be preferred, UA going through it must cross q(·, p) at some point between DA,B2 and DFI2 .
At DA,B2 , q(D
A,B
2 , p) > q(D
A,B
2 , 0) and, as D2 → ∞, the limD2→∞ q(D2, p) > 0 and the in-
difference curve going through (DA,B2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) goes to 0. Continuity and monotonicity of
q(D2, p) is straightforward and of the indifference curve has been shown in appendix 1.7.2.
Hence, they cannot cross to the right of DA,B2 , and D
FI
2 is type A’s optimal choice. To sum
up, DFI2 is the optimal choice of both A and B given the system of beliefs and, therefore, by
Bayes’ rule, µ = p at DFI2 .
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1.7.5 Definition of the Undefeated Equilibrium refinement
Let e∗ and e′ be two equilibria of the game and {(D∗2(i), q∗;µ∗(·))}i∈{A,B} and {(D′2(i), q′;µ′(·))}i∈{A,B}
its respective outcomes. If:
1. D′2 is a non-equilibrium outcome in e
∗.
2. Θ = {{A}, {B}, {A,B}, {∅}} is the set of types that choose strategy D′2 in e′.
3. Denoting U i(e) the utility of type i under equilibrium e:
U i(e′) ≥ U i(e)∀i ∈ Θ,
with the inequality being strict for at least one i ∈ Θ.
4. The off-equilibrium beliefs after observing D′2 in e
∗, µ∗(D′2), are positive for the type(s)
with a strict inequality and zero for the type(s) not belonging to Θ,
then, whenever µ∗(D′2) do not support e
∗, e∗ is defeated by e′.
1.7.6 Selection of the separating equilibrium e∗
For e∗ to be the unique equilibrium it must be that: a) e∗ is undefeated and b) it defeats all
other equilibria.
a) e∗ is defeated if there is an equilibrium e′ whose µ′ at D′2 is not consistent with e
∗. Note
that this can only happen:
• To the right of D−B2 if ∀D2 ∈ [DB2 , D−B2 ] q(D2, µ) > q(D2, 1), which is impossible
according to the definition of PBE.
• To the left of D−B2 any possible equilibria are of the pooling type. Hence, equilibrium
beliefs are q(D2, µ) = q(D2, p) and q(D2, p) needs to be above A’s isoutility curve
going through
(
D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)
)
.
Thus, q(D2, p) < q(D2, U¯
A), where U¯A = UA
(
D−B2 , q(D
−B
2 , 1)
)
, is the condition for e∗ to
survive.34 The condition holds for a sufficiently low p:
p < 1 +
U¯A − ω1 +D1 + (2β − β′) (1− F (D2 + cA))− β(1 + cA +D2 + h−1)
β′D2 (F (D2 + cB)− F (D2 + cA))
.
For example, for β′ = 1, β = 0.6, cA = 0, cB = 1, h = 1 and D1 − ω1 = 0, any p < 1
would work.
34q(·) has been defined as the function that maps (D2, U¯A) to q: R× R→ R+.
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b) Now, take e∗ that is undefeated. This means that U i(e∗) ≥ U i(e′)∀i, with strict inequality
for at least one i, for any other equilibrium e′. On the other hand, off-equilibrium beliefs
in equilibrium e′ must be µ′(D2) 6= 1 ∀D2 6= D′2 in order to be able to sustain e′. But,
since Θ = {A} for D−B2 in e∗ and UA(e∗) > UA(e′), µ′(D−B2 ) = 1 and any e′ is defeated
by e∗.
1.7.7 Selection of the pooling equilibria
Let us show that a pooling equilibrium e′ can defeat the least cost separating equilibrium e∗.
e′ will defeat e∗ if UA(e′) ≥ UA(e∗) and UB(e′) > UB(e∗). D′2 is not an equilibrium strategy
for A in e∗ but both types choose D′2 in e
′, hence Θ = {A,B}. Off-equilibrium beliefs about
the type(s) that choose D′2 in e
∗ need to be positive for both A and B. Hence,
µ∗(D2) =

p ifD′2
1 ifD−B2
0 otherwise.
Condition UB(e′) > UB(e∗), i.e. UB(DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) > U
B(DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 0)), is clearly
true. And for its A counterpart, UA(DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) ≥ UA((D−B2 , q∗(D−B2 , 1)), it suffices to
choose a p that is close enough to 1. Take, for example, 1 − , where  is very small. Note
that
UA(DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) = p
[
UA
(
DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 1)
)]
+ (1− p) [UA (DFI2 , q∗(DFI2 , 0))]
and that
UA
(
DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 1)
)
> UA
(
D−B2 , q
∗(D−B2 , 1)
)
,
because it is the full information solution. Thus, using p = 1− ,
UA(DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , p)) = (1− )
[
UA
(
DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 1)
)]
+ 
[
UA
(
DFI2 , q
∗(DFI2 , 0)
)]
> UA(
(
D−B2 , q
∗(D−B2 , 1)
)
.
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1.7.8 Multiple-period model
Let us show that the multiple period problem with iid shocks to the type is the same as the
repetition of the two-period model. We will construct our model backwards, starting from
the two period version of the model. Recall the two-period sovereign problem. When D2
is chosen the borrower knows his type ci2. By analogy, we will keep this important timing
assumption. With the aim of writing the general multi-period problem, we write the two-
period problem emphasizing the relevant states and eliminating the time subscript. Future
choices are indicated with prime. Moreover, we write the generalized version of it with an
arbitrary initial level of debt D and endowment ω and allowing the possibility of default.
Let
u(D,ω, c) := max {c, ω −D}
be the flow value in each period considering the default choice and assuming that the choice
of default occurs before issuing the new debt.
max
D′,c
c+ β
∫ ∞
ω
u(D′, ω′, c′)f(ω′)dω′ (1.7.6)
subject to
c =
ω −D + q(D′, µ(D′))D′ if ω > D + c,c+ q(D′, µ(D′))D′ otherwise;
The borrower takes as given the price schedule and the belief schedule that generates
it. For all D′ and µ(D′) consistent with lender optimality and competition in the lending
market, we have: q(D′, µ(D′)) = β′ [µ(D′)( 1−F (D′+ cA) )+(1− µ(D′))( 1−F (D′+ cB ))] .
In the baseline version of the model in the main text, we assumed fixed types and no default
in the first period.
Before moving to three or more periods note that - thanks to the linearity of preferences,
the previous problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
D′
u(D,ω, c) + q(D′, µ(D′))D′ + β
∫ ∞
ω
u(D′, ω′, c′)f(ω′)dω′ (1.7.7)
=u(D,ω, c) +W1(c
′, µ), (1.7.8)
where
W1(c
′, µ) := max
D′
q(D′, µ(D′))D′ + β
∫ ∞
ω
u(D′, ω′, c′)f(ω′)dω′.
This formulation emphasizes an important stationary property of our model with linear
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preferences: the decision of future debt is only function of the type the borrower knows at
the moment of re-payment. In particular, it does not depend on the initial outstanding debt
or the previous type of the borrower. The simple default condition arises from the assumption
that there is no dynamic punishment for default. We now move to three periods. We assume
that types cit are drawn independently across time, with support {A,B} and probability p
and 1 − p, respectively. We can consider the previous two-period model as the last two
periods of a three-period model. Assuming the lender beliefs schedule - and hence the price
schedule q - is time constant, we can define
V2(D,ω, c, µ) := u(D,ω, c) + pW1(c
A, µ) + (1− p)W1(cB, µ) (1.7.9)
We can hence define the function W2 recursively as follows:
W2(c, µ) := max
D
q(D,µ(D))D + β
∫ ∞
ω
V2(D,ω, c, µ)f(ω)dω.
Given that we derived the recursive formulation of the three period problem, the extension
to an arbitrary number of periods is immediate. The Bellman equation is as follows. For
any level of debt D, endowment ω and initial type ci we have
Vt(D,ω, c, µ) = u(D,ω, c) + pWt−1(cA, µ) + (1− p)Wt−1(cB, µ),
where for all c ∈ {cA, cB} :
Wt−1(c, µ) = max
D
q(D,µ(D))D + β
∫ ∞
ω
Vt−1(D,ω, c, µ)f(ω)dω.
In other terms, if we exclude the fact that the number of remaining periods decreases,
each period can be seen as any other one with different initial conditions. The default
decision will be always determinate by the difference ω−D, justifying the stationarity of the
price schedule q. In our linear set-up, the initial conditions do not affect the shape of the
indifference curve (as they only shift them in a parallel fashion). Both the full information
optimal debt level, DFI = β
′−β
β′h , and the condition for the separating equilibrium debt level,
D−B: UB(D−B, q(D−B, 1)) = UB(DFI , q(DFI , 0)) remain the same. The single crossing
condition property is also maintained, hence, the solution to the problem between any two
periods.
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1.7.9 The ratings geography and time span
Country Moody’s Fitch S&P Country Moody’s Fitch S&P
Australia 1980 1996 1980 Malawi - 2003-09 -
Austria 1980 1995 1980 Malta 1994 1997 1994
Belgium 1980 1995 1989 Mexico 1991 1996 1993
Botswana 2001 - 2001 Morocco 1999 2007 1998
Bulgaria 1997 1998 1999 Netherlands 1986 1995 1989
Canada 1980 1995 1980 New Zealand 1980 2000 1980
Cyprus 1996 2002 1994 Norway 1980 1995 1980
Czech Republic 1993 1996 1994 Pakistan 1995 - 1995
Denmark 1980 1995 1981 Papua New Guinea 1999 1999 1999
Estonia 1998 1998 1998 Philippines 1994 1999 1994
Fiji 1997 - 2007 Poland 1995 1996 1995
Finland 1980 1995 1980 Portugal 1987 1995 1989
France 1980 1995 1980 Romania 1996 1996 1996
Germany 1986 1995 1984 Russia 1997 1997 1997
Ghana - 2004 2004 Seychelles - 2010 2007-09
Greece 1991 1996 1989 Singapore 1990 1999 1989
Guatemala 1998 2006 2002 Slovak Republic 1995 1997 1994
Honduras 1999 - 2009 Slovenia 1996 1997 1996
Hungary 1990 1996 1992 South Africa 1995 1995 1995
Iceland 1989 2000 1989 Spain 1988 1995 1989
India 1988 2000 1991 Sri Lanka 2011 2006 2006
Ireland 1988 1995 1989 Sweden 1980 1995 1980
Italy 1987 1995 1989 Switzerland 1982 1995 1989
Jamaica 1998 2007 2000 Thailand 1990 1998 1989
Japan 1982 1995 1980 Trinidad and Tobago 1993 - 1996
Korea 1987 1996 1989 Uganda - 2005 2009
Latvia 1998 1998 1997 United Kingdom 1980 1995 1980
Lithuania 1997 1997 1997 United States 1980 1995 1980
Luxembourg 1990 1995 1995 Venezuela 1980 1998 1980
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1.7.10 Yield Events
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year
Czech Republic 2003 Pakistan 1992 Cyprus 2006 New Zealand 1992
Greece 2010 Portugal 2011 Ethiopia 1987 Norway 1993
Honduras 1994 South Africa 1988 Honduras 1997 Norway 2004
Honduras 1996 Sri Lanka 1991 Italy 1984 Norway 2009
Iceland 2008 Switzerland 1994 Japan 1992 Pakistan 2003
Jamaica 1985 Switzerland 1999 Japan 1997 Seychelles 2003
Jamaica 1990 Switzerland 2003 Japan 1998 Singapore 2007
Japan 1990 Thailand 2004 Japan 2001 Slovenia 1993
Japan 1999 Uganda 1984 Japan 2007 Slovenia 1994
Lithuania 2009 Uganda 1985 Korea 1981 Solomon Islands 2004
Luxembourg 2006 Uganda 1986 Korea 1982 Solomon Islands 2005
Malawi 1995 Uganda 1989 Korea 1983 Switzerland 2000
New Zealand 1996 United States 2005 Latvia 2011 Switzerland 2002
Norway 1998 Lithuania 2010 Switzerland 2008
Luxembourg 1988 Switzerland 2011
Mexico 2001 Thailand 1987
Namibia 2001 Vanuatu 1989
Nepal 1991 Vanuatu 2008
1.7.11 Dataset: definition of variables
General government gross debt (Debt, % GDP): Gross debt consists of all liabilities
that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the
creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of
SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standard-
ized guarantee schemes, as well as other accounts payable (World Economic Outlook
2013, WEO13).
General government net lending/ borrowing (Net lending, % GDP): Net lending
(+)/ borrowing (-) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure. It is also equal
to net acquisition of financial assets minus net incurrence of liabilities (WEO13).
General government primary net lending/ borrowing (Primary surplus, % GDP):
Primary net lending/ borrowing is net lending (+)/ borrowing (-) plus net interest
payable/ paid (interest expense minus interest revenue) (WEO13).
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General government structural balance (CAPB, national currency): The structural
budget balance refers to the general government cyclically adjusted balance adjusted
for nonstructural elements beyond the economic cycle. These include temporary fi-
nancial sector and asset price movements as well as one-off, or temporary, revenue or
expenditure items. The cyclically adjusted balance is the fiscal balance adjusted for
the effects of the economic cycle (WEO13).
General government structural balance (CAPB, % potential GDP): The structural
budget balance refers to the general government cyclically adjusted balance adjusted
for nonstructural elements beyond the economic cycle. These include temporary fi-
nancial sector and asset price movements as well as one-off, or temporary, revenue or
expenditure items. The cyclically adjusted balance is the fiscal balance adjusted for
the effects of the economic cycle (WEO13).
General government total expenditure (Expenditure, % GDP): Total expenditure
consists of total expense and the net acquisition of non-financial assets (WEO13).
GDP corresponding to fiscal year, current prices (GDP, billions of national currency):
Gross domestic product corresponding to fiscal year is the country’s GDP based on
the same period during the year as their fiscal data. In the case of countries whose
fiscal data are based on a fiscal calendar (e.g., July to June), this series would be the
country’s GDP over that same period. For countries whose fiscal data are based on a
calendar year (i.e., January to December), this series will be the same as their GDP in
current prices (WEO13).
GDP growth (Growth, %): author’s own calculation applying the formula GDPt−GDPt−1
GDPt
to the GDP series corresponding to fiscal year (current prices).
GDP per capita, constant prices (GDPpc, units of national currency): GDP is ex-
pressed in constant national currency per person. Data are derived by dividing constant
price GDP by total population (WEO13).
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1.7.12 First stage IV regressions
Table 1.10: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Corrt−1
Newst−1 0.00222*** 0.00213*** 0.00214*** 0.00222***
(0.000268) (0.000285) (0.000290) (0.000267)
MCOt−1 -0.000394* -0.000365 -0.000480* -0.000383
(0.000237) (0.000249) (0.000258) (0.000237)
N 611 541 513 611
R-square 0.539 0.567 0.547 0.540
F 11.35 12.01 11.39 11.37
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.7.13 Robustness check for contagion
Table 1.11: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Yield Shockst−1 0.459*** 0.468*** 0.249** -0.265**
(0.157) (0.166) (0.122) (0.128)
Net lendingt−1 0.724***
(0.0426)
Primary surplust−1 0.753***
(0.0410)
CAPBt−1 0.720***
(0.0554)
Expendituret−1 0.770***
(0.0344)
Debtt−1 0.0198 0.0510*** 0.00951 0.00266
(0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0107) (0.0123)
Debt2t−1 -0.000161*** -0.000249*** -0.0000845* 0.0000686
(0.0000470) (0.0000498) (0.0000488) (0.0000477)
Log GDPt−1 -1.784** -2.430*** -2.424** 1.177
(0.816) (0.812) (1.150) (0.794)
Log GDPpct−1 1.881 4.002** 2.876 0.858
(1.635) (1.894) (2.042) (1.585)
Growtht−1 5.182 2.142 8.253 -5.805
(3.936) (4.450) (6.371) (3.930)
Ratingt−1 -0.116** -0.0976* -0.0594 0.0781*
(0.0473) (0.0550) (0.0479) (0.0431)
Log yieldst−1 0.00670 0.617 0.827 0.441
(0.455) (0.535) (0.583) (0.407)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 748 658 598 748
R-square 0.849 0.845 0.846 0.979
F 41.58 43.36 . 661.5
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.7.14 Regression by country groups
Table 1.12: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of a 1 unit change in Corrt in: OECD EU PERIPHERALS EM
Net lending/borrowing -0.0284*** -0.0350*** -0.0770** -0.0249
(0.00885) (0.0112) (0.0333) (0.0233)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.823 0.765 0.741 0.761
F 45.38 33.02 14.59 45.21
Primary balance -0.0258*** -0.0315*** -0.0722** -0.0272
(0.00863) (0.0107) (0.0319) (0.0222)
N 534 396 92 96
R-square 0.752 0.712 0.733 0.731
F 39.80 32.87 13.86 44.28
Potential structural balance -0.0107* -0.0105 -0.0574** -0.0220
(0.00645) (0.00856) (0.0243) (0.0182)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.848 0.852 0.857 0.853
F 59.24 43.61 22.59 70.95
Government spending 0.0246*** 0.0278** 0.0425 0.0246
(0.00906) (0.0122) (0.0282) (0.0310)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.942 0.928 0.840 0.975
F 399.3 249.0 62.09 302.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.7.15 Introduction of a common debt limit
In this section I analyze the effect of setting an exogenous common debt limit. This policy
only has an effect when the debt ceiling D¯2 is lower than type B’s full information allocation
DFI2 , as in figure 1.7. Suppose the equilibrium is the separating one e
∗. Once the debt ceiling
is introduced, type B is not allowed to choose its optimal debt level because it would violate
the fiscal rule. In a separating equilibrium under the new debt ceiling rule, type B chooses
the highest amount of debt possible, D¯2, as depicted in figure 1.8. But this gives type B
a lower utility, thereby forcing type A to choose an even lower amount of debt than D−B2 .
Type A needs to implement more austerity in order to avoid imitation from B because the
outside option for B has become worse. Both types are worse off, even though the riskiness
of debt improves because the sovereigns have a lower default probability.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a debt limit might let the separating equilibrium be
defeated. For instance, the pooling equilibrium at D¯2 in figure 1.9 makes both types better
off, thus defeating the separating equilibrium. Compared with the initial equilibrium e∗ in
figure 1.7, however, every country type loses. This can be seen by comparing the utility
levels of type A and B with the equilibrium allocations from figure 1.7 represented by the
dotted lines. Moreover, type B’s default premium decreases but A’s increases, as the arrows
on the vertical axis show, thus the overall probability of default may increase or decrease.
All countries can be made worse off by the introduction of a debt ceiling, which also fails to
improve the riskiness of debt.
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Figure 1.7: A common debt ceiling at D¯2.
Figure 1.8: Separating equilibrium with a
common debt ceiling.
Figure 1.9: Pooling equilibrium with a com-
mon debt ceiling.
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Chapter 2
Unsolicited Sovereign Ratings and
Market Selection
2.1 Introduction
Unsolicited ratings are opinions about the creditworthiness of the borrower that are not
initiated nor paid for by the issuer. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) has been issuing unsolicited
ratings since 1996. Moody’s and Fitch - the other two biggest rating agencies - have been
doing it as well.1 Since the majority of the rating agencies (CRAs) receive compensation
from the issuer, one could wonder why the rating agencies would want to issue a rating for
which they do not receive fees.
Fulghieri et al. (2014) propose a strategic motivation for unsolicited ratings. They argue
that unsolicited ratings can be used as threat to pressure issuers towards solicitation. This
model implies that unsolicited ratings have to be lower on average than solicited ones and
this fact is consistent with the empirical literature.2
Further evidence on the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings is brought
by Bannier et al. (2010). They compare the ex-post default probabilities of similar non-U.S.
borrowers with solicited and unsolicited S&P ratings between January 1996 and December
2006 and find that, conditional on a rating, default probabilities are different across the two
groups. The unsolicited rating group has lower default rates, which might be an indication
that rating agencies choose to rate those borrowers more strictly compared to solicited ones.
Understanding whether lower unsolicited ratings are motivated by strategic considera-
1At least since 2000 and 2001, respectively, Moody’s and Fitch have recognised issuing unsolicited rat-
ings (Behr and Guettler, 2008) but they were possibly doing it before that.
2Evidence that unsolicited ratings are associated with lower grades is broad in the empirical litera-
ture (Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon and Chan, 2010; Van Roy, 2013).
51
tions of the rating agencies is important for policy. For example, the rating agency Moody’s
had been subjected to an antitrust investigation in 1996 by America’s Justice Department,
which suspected that the agency’s practice of issuing unsolicited ratings on companies might
be “a way to force them to pay up for the full service” (The Economist, 2001).
In this paper, I argue that lower average unsolicited rating grades and a lower probability
of default in unsolicited ratings vis-a`-vis the same solicited ratings do not necessarily imply
the strategic use of lower ratings by the rating agencies. Different types of firms might
select themselves into soliciting or not soliciting ratings depending on their characteristics.
For example, more solvent firms may reasonably expect higher grades on average and thus
have more incentives to solicit a rating. Unsolicited ratings are, therefore, more likely to be
assigned to lower quality firms.
An argument against the strategic motivation of the CRA for giving unsolicited ratings
is the fact that, in the sovereign market, unsolicited ratings have higher grades - not lower
- than solicited ones. Figure 2.1 reports the histograms of Moody’s unsolicited and solicited
sovereign grades between 2010 and 2015. The distribution of unsolicited ratings has more
weight to higher grades compared to that of solicited ratings. The unconditional mean of
Figure 2.1: Histogram of solicited versus unsolicited rating grades. Source: Moody’s, 2010
-2015.
solicited sovereign ratings is a Baa2 grade while that of unsolicited ratings is on average an A2
grade.3 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of the difference in means is significantly different
3Moody’s rating scale is, in decreasing order of credit quality: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C.
Moody’s adds numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each rating grade from Aa through Caa.
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Figure 2.2: Moody’s revenues by line of business from 2000 to 2007.
from zero as can be seen in table 2.1. The median values are also statistically different.
More generally, equality of the distribution functions is rejected at the 99% confidence using
a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S statistic: 0.4348).
Table 2.1: Differences between sovereign mean and median grades for solicited and unso-
licited ratings. Source: Moody’s, 2010 -2015.
difference in value t-statistic p-value
Mean −3.89 −5.31 0.0000
Median −8 20.46 0.0000
The fact that unsolicited sovereign ratings are higher on average calls for a model of
market self-selection that is able to produce not only a downward bias but also an upward
one, like the one I present here.
Credit rating agencies provide as well “ancillary services”, a business that has been grow-
ing since the late 90s. Ancillary services “comprise market forecasts, estimates of economic
trends, pricing analysis and other general data analysis as well as related distribution ser-
vices” (ESMA, 2013). Since 2000 the share of revenues from the rating business went from a
maximum of 90% (in 2002) to 70% (in 2015) versus an increasing share of ancillary services
that reaches up to 30% (see figures 2.2 and 2.3). An example of ancillary service consists
in providing the borrower with a forecast of the rating. Moody’s Rating Assessment Service
was launched in 2000 and charges a company 75.000 euros to know what its credit rating
would be if it solicited one (The Economist, 2001). Feedback is provided only to the issuer
and assessments are confidential until the issuer decides to announce them publicly. S&P
also offers a similar service: the Ratings Evaluation System.
Literature. Fulghieri et al. (2014) introduce the first model of strategic motivation for
unsolicited ratings. They see unsolicited ratings as an off-equilibrium threat, which is credible
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Figure 2.3: Moody’s revenues by line of business from 2006 to 2015.
because it shows that the CRA fights the temptation to issue inflated ratings. Byoun (2014)
presents a model of ratings where the existence of unsolicited ratings in equilibrium is not
strategically motivated, it is granted by the assumption that the CRA has to produce a
rating for each firm. In my model, rating agencies are interested in issuing unsolicited
ratings because it improves visibility, allowing the CRA to charge higher fees on solicited
ratings.
There is ample empirical evidence regarding the properties of unsolicited ratings (Poon
and Firth, 2005; Poon and Chan, 2010; Van Roy, 2013; Bannier et al., 2010; Gan, 2004).
None of them studies sovereign unsolicited ratings. As we will see below, descriptive statis-
tics evidence indicate that, contrary to what has been found in other markets, unsolicited
sovereign ratings have higher grades and are associated with lower bond yields compared to
solicited ones. This contrasts with what has been found in the previous literature for banks,
corporations and insurance companies (Behr and Guettler, 2008; Byoun, 2014; Klusak et al.,
2015).
This paper sheds light on the relationship between different services provided by the
rating agency. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that considers the ratings
and the ancillary services jointly. The business of ancillary services has received attention
from the regulators, who advocated more transparency in order to avoid conflicts of interest.4
Here I focus on their effect in the selection that arises in the market.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section I present some stylised facts
about the sovereign unsolicited ratings. In section 2.3, I set up a model of borrowing un-
der incomplete information where the credit rating agencies may issue ratings, solicited as
well as unsolicited, and provide ancillary services. I solve for the equilibrium, characterise
4Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, amended by Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013.
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the equilibrium outcomes and present the relationship to the empirical facts. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Stylized facts about sovereign ratings
2.2.1 Unsolicited sovereign ratings are more frequent than in other
markets
Unsolicited ratings are not issued homogeneously across market segments nor across regions.
In 2000, the proportion of unsolicited ratings with respect to the total number of outstanding
ratings varied between 6% and 27% in industrial countries, depending on rating agency and
region (Bannier et al., 2010). In the US, unsolicited ratings are rare. In the European
Union they are more numerous, especially in the segment of sovereign and public finance.
Table 2.2 reports the number of ratings issued by each rating agency by solicitation status
and for each market segment. In 2012, 12.24% of the sovereign and public finance ratings
by the three biggest rating agencies in the EU was unsolicited, while only 4.95% of the
corporate ratings, 3.33% of the financial and insurance institutions and 0% of the structured
finance ratings (ESMA, 2013). The agencies Moody’s and S&P gave in 2012 more unsolicited
Fitch Moody’s S&P
Corporate
Solicited
518 760 951
82.48% 99.48% 99.79%
Unsolicited
110 4 2
17.52% 0.52% 0.21%
Financials and Insurance
Solicited
597 542 1006
97.07% 99.82% 94.82%
Unsolicited
18 1 55
2.93% 0.18% 5.18%
Sovereign and Public Finance
Solicited
296 232 189
83.38% 93.93% 87.91%
Unsolicited
59 15 26
16.62% 6.07% 12.09%
Structured Finance
Solicited
4861 4438 4705
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Unsolicited
0 0 0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 2.2: Ratings by solicitation status for different market segments in the EU in 2012.
Source: ESMA.
rating to sovereigns than to other categories and Fitch to both sovereigns and corporates.
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The majority of the other smaller rating agencies specialize in issuing only solicited or only
unsolicited ratings (ESMA, 2013).
For the agency Moody’s, the fraction of sovereigns that receive an unsolicited rating are
distributed by grade as follows: 10.9% are high grades (investment grade) and 4.15% are low
grades (below investment grade) as can be read from table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Fraction of sovereigns that receive an unsolicited rating by rating grade (Moody’s,
2010-2015).
Unsolicited Observations
Grade Baa3 or above 10.9% 412
Grade below Baa3 4.15% 313
2.2.2 Unsolicited sovereign ratings are higher than solicited ones
In a sample of all the sovereign ratings issued by Moody’s between 2010 and 2015,5 I trans-
lated the rating grades into a numerical scale that goes from 1 (grade C) to 21 (grade AAA).
If we control for some observable characteristics of the sovereigns (current account, debt over
GDP, primary deficit, GDP per capita, inflation, direct investment and a set of regional and
year dummies), having an unsolicited rating improves the rating grade by almost one and a
half points with respect to a similar country that has paid for its rating. From a rating of
Baa2, this would imply an upgrade to A3. The specification is similar to that of Gan (2004)
and Van Roy (2013):
Ratingi,t = Xi,tβ + δSolicitationi,t + i,t (2.2.1)
but including time (year) as well as region (country) variation, where Solicitation is a dummy
variable for the solicitation status that takes value 0 if the rating is solicited and 1 if it is
unsolicited. Table 2.4 presents the estimated coefficient δˆ, which is positive and significant
at the 1% level.
The first column does not include fixed effects. The estimated positive effect of receiving
on unsolicited rating becomes larger and more significant once you include year fixed effects
(column 2), country fixed effects (column 3) or both (column 4). The average rating grade
is higher for unsolicited sovereign ratings.
Is this effect homogeneous along the rating scale? Table 5 reports three quantile regres-
sions. The first column refers to the effect of solicitation on the rating grade for the first
5The sample is obtained from reading the internal documents published by Moody’s (“Unsolicited Ratings
List”) from its earliest release in September, 6 2010 to the latest in December 30, 2015.
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Table 2.4: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade
Solicitation dummy 0.939* 1.489*** 0.984** 1.469***
(0.498) (0.512) (0.489) (0.506)
Current account 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.128***
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Debt -0.0177*** -0.0214*** -0.0172*** -0.0207***
(0.00427) (0.00437) (0.00425) (0.00434)
Primary deficit -0.211*** -0.196*** -0.209*** -0.194***
(0.0320) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0296)
GDP per capita 0.000152*** 0.000143*** 0.000151*** 0.000143***
(0.00000924) (0.00000955) (0.00000920) (0.00000956)
Inflation -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.156*** -0.150***
(0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0221) (0.0216)
Direct investment 0.136*** 0.121*** 0.135*** 0.119***
(0.0199) (0.0215) (0.0197) (0.0214)
Region FE no yes no yes
Time FE no no yes yes
N 669 669 669 669
R-square 0.676 0.690 0.682 0.695
F 126.0 418.5 72.17 198.9
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
quartile (0.25) and its effect is the least significant and the smallest. The higher the rating
grades (columns 2 and 3), the more sizeable the positive effect of unsolicited ratings.
Let us see which countries are likely to receive unsolicited ratings. The unconditional
probability for an individual country of obtaining an unsolicited rating is 7.49% in my sample.
It is more likely, though, for countries with a higher rating grade, more outstanding public
debt over GDP and a higher GDP per capita. Controlling for other factors, being in the
region of Europe or East Asia makes it less likely that a suitable candidate receives an
unsolicited rating. This might be due to the fact that there are more countries in those
regions that could potentially be candidates.
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Table 2.5: Quantile regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Rating grade Rating grade Rating grade
Solicitation dummy 0.775* 1.371*** 1.536***
(0.409) (0.461) (0.451)
Current account 0.109*** 0.142*** 0.120***
(0.0134) (0.0161) (0.0157)
Debt -0.0177*** -0.0241*** -0.0225***
(0.00331) (0.00370) (0.00415)
Primary deficit -0.138*** -0.165*** -0.179***
(0.0271) (0.0302) (0.0245)
GDP per capita 0.000127*** 0.000175*** 0.000196***
(0.00000808) (0.00000725) (0.00000620)
Inflation -0.202*** -0.134*** -0.134***
(0.0139) (0.0181) (0.0216)
Direct investment 0.107*** 0.155*** 0.156***
(0.0212) (0.0208) (0.0215)
Region FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
N 669 669 669
Quantile 0.25 0.50 0.75
Residual degree freedom 651 651 651
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In order to see whether Moody’s changed its criteria for rating countries unsolicitedly over
time, I predicted the estimated probability that a country of certain characteristics receives
an unsolicited rating for each year between 2010 and 2015.6 As expected, countries rated
unsolicitedly had a higher predicted probability of receiving an unsolicited rating. But other
countries with solicited ratings were just as likely or more to receive an unsolicited rating,
for example Austria, Belgium, Norway, Botswana, South Africa and Ghana. You can find
the complete list of the sovereign unsolicited ratings in the first column in appendix 2.5.2.
In the second column there is the list of sovereigns with a predicted probability of receiving
6See appendix 2.5.1.
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an unsolicited rating higher than the average predicted probability of the sovereigns in the
first column. First, in 2010 and 2011, the profile were top quality sovereign borrowers in
Europe. Later on, as the competition across CRAs got increasingly intense and Africa started
issuing international debt more frequently, some relatively stable economies in that continent
became natural candidates for unsolicited ratings as well.
2.2.3 Unsolicited sovereign ratings have lower associated debt yields
I merged the sample of Moody’s unsolicited ratings between November 2010 and December
2015 with the long-term sovereign yields at the end of the month for the same period. I also
have data on the outlook (negative, neutral or positive) at the end of the month. I use the
following specification:
Sovereign Y ieldsi,t = Xi,tβ + λSolicitationi,t + ui,t (2.2.2)
and report the results in table 2.6. In a linear regression of the yields on the solicitation
dummy variable (and additional controls), I find that the unsolicited status of a rating grade
represents an average decrease of 3.8 percentage points in the sovereign yields compared to
the solicited status. Unsolicited ratings are associated with an improvement in the price of
debt higher than that of a one point higher rating grade (0.75) or a better outlook (0.22)7
Thus, the market charges a lower risk premium to bonds from issuers with high unsolicited
rating grades than to bonds from issuers with the same solicited grades. For example, a
triple A unsolicited borrower pays on average 1.67, whereas a triple A solicited one pays an
average yield of 2.43.
How good are the ratings at explaining the sovereign yields? The correlation between
sovereign yields and sovereign ratings is −0.69, both for solicited as well as for unsolicited
ratings. Year by year the correlation can be found in figure 2.4 and it is shown to be not
significantly different for the groups of solicited and unsolicited ratings. Hence, there is no
evidence that the rating agencies perform better at predicting the sovereign yields in any
particular category.
2.3 Model
A crucial component of the model will be market selection. I hence need to introduce
borrowers’ heterogeneity. For simplicity I assume there are only two types of borrowers, one
7The outlook becomes insignificant in my last specification once all controls have been introduced.
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Table 2.6: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
Sovereign yields Sovereign yields Sovereign yields
Solicitation dummy -3.023*** -3.023*** -3.823***
(0.127) (0.125) (0.126)
Rating -0.314*** -0.379*** -0.745***
(0.0626) (0.0623) (0.198)
Positive outlook no -2.600*** -0.223
(0.398) (0.195)
Negative outlook no 1.187*** 0.277
(0.338) (0.256)
Country FE yes yes yes
Month FE yes yes yes
Country-Year FE no no yes
N 1837 1837 1837
R-square 0.768 0.771 0.923
F 138.8 145.6 717.1
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
with a higher probability to default than the other. The probability to default is ex-ante
not observable. But the CRA can obtain information about it at a cost. This cost can be
interpreted as the analyst wage to study the data and produce a rating. The CRA incurs
this cost every time they have to come up with a rating, regardless of whether they are
compensated for it or not.
Unsolicited ratings are a way to increase the visibility of a rating agency. According
to Byoun and Shin (2012),“unsolicited ratings are also considered a means of raising a
rating agency’s profile in particular countries: that is, rating agencies provide unsolicited
ratings to investors in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over those who do not
assign unsolicited rating”. As an agency becomes known it will be more likely approached
by some client to request its services. Clearly, borrowers who are unaware of the existence of
a particular rating agency are not going to ask for a solicited rating there. Even if a rating
agency is known already, producing more ratings or more recent ratings may be a way to
let the market know about your technology and advertise your accuracy. A more standard
rating is easier for the lenders to interpret and more attractive when trying to attract funds.
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Figure 2.4: Confidence intervals for the correlation between sovereign yields and ratings by
Moody’s from 2010 to 2015 separated by solicitation status.
For instance, the company FCE Bank plc replies to an ESMA call for evidence on the
“Competition, choice and conflicts of interest in the credit rating industry” that “in order
to protect and provide confidence to our investors, we tend to select the market accepted
CRAs.” (ESMA, 2015).
In the previous section we saw evidence that 1) in the sovereign market unsolicited rat-
ings are more numerous, 2) unsolicited sovereign ratings have higher grades than solicited
sovereign ratings and 3) unsolicited ratings are associated with lower debt yields, that is,
sovereigns with unsolicited ratings pay less for issuing debt than others with the same grade
but solicited ratings. Current theories about the existence of unsolicited ratings cannot ac-
count for these facts. Unsolicited ratings are generally modelled as a punishment in the form
of downward biased ratings, which contradicts evidence 2 and 3. Or they can be an option
that only some borrowers face: those not confident enough to ask for a rating previously. I
present an economic mechanism that may account for these facts by changing two assump-
tions: the first one is the timing, the CRA chooses whether to assign an unsolicited rating
before the borrower decides if it solicits one. The second assumption is about the beliefs in
the case of unsolicited ratings: I assume the borrowers do not expect the CRA to give them
a bad rating if the CRA knows this information is untrue.
My model gives rise to two possible equilibria as a function of some parameters: one
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where unsolicited ratings are associated with lower grades and another one where they are
associated with higher grades. In what follows, the determinants of each of these equilibria
will become clear.
2.3.1 Basic economic environment
Borrowers can be of two types i ∈ {A,B} with shares θ and 1− θ. Each borrower of type i
gets indebted for a fixed amount D. The future gross return is R˜ = R with probability λi
and R˜ = r with probability 1 − λi, where R > D > r > 0. Since the borrower has limited
liability, type i’s probability of default is 1− λi, where 1 ≥ λA > λB > 0.
Lenders do not know the borrower’s type. They are risk neutral with discount factor β.
Lenders compete on debt prices a` la Bertrand, making zero expected profits. They charge a
price q for lending D, taking into account the expected probability of default, which will be
specified later. For a pair (q,D), the borrower’s expected payoff equals qD + Ei{R˜} − λiD,
where Ei{R˜} := λiR + (1− λi)r.
In the economy, there exists a credit rating agency (CRA) which has access to costly
private information about the borrower’s type. By paying a cost c, the CRA receives the
random signal σ = {H,L}: if the country is of type A, the CRA receives the H signal with
probability 1 while, if the country is of type B, the H signal is received with probability
p < 1. The rating grade consists of a truthful report on the signal received and is denoted
by g ∈ {H,L}.
A borrower can choose to solicit a rating to the agency before issuing debt. The benefit
of doing so is that a rating can give information to the market and improve the debt price q
that the lenders are willing to offer. The rating agency charges a fee φ for issuing solicited
ratings.
The CRA can also issue unsolicited ratings. Unsolicited ratings are free of charge. As
we will see, the CRA benefits from unsolicited ratings because they affect the fee that can
be charged for a rating. I assume that when a CRA issues more ratings (either solicited or
unsolicited), it has a higher visibility and/ or improves its bargaining power with respect
to the borrower. Therefore, unsolicited ratings allow the agency to charge higher fees for
solicited ratings. I assume the following functional form: φ(D, γ) = α1 +α2γD. For α1, α2 >
0 fees are increasing in the amount of debt issued and in the fraction of unsolicited ratings
assigned.
The CRA also provides ancillary services for a fee χ. Ancillary services give the borrower
the opportunity to learn about the CRA’s private signal and to veto the revelation of that
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Figure 2.5: Ancillary services assesment.
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information.8 The rating assesment m = {h, l} is an imperfect forecast of the rating signal
g and it is summarized in figure 2.5. An assesment m = h is received with probability 1
2
and
m = l with probability 1
2
. Conditional on receiving a positive assesment, type B receives a
rating grade H with probability p+ , and L with the complementary probability 1− p− ,
whereas conditional on a negative assesment a rating grade H is given with probability p− 
and L with probability 1 − p + . There is no uncertainty about type A rating, it receives
H with probability 1. Assume  > 0 and  < 1 − p. These probabilities can be seen as
posteriors and the technology of information acquisition is the same in both cases.
Additionally, in the ancillary services contract, the agency commits not to issue an un-
solicited rating if the borrower does not solicit one.
Assume that a fraction ξ of borrowers do not enter the game; they access the market
issuing unrated debt. This assumption guarantees that the g = L rating, which is fully
revealing of a B type, is perceived to be worse than no rating g = 0. Having a low rating
or being downgraded is known to have an effect in the price of debt. It is reasonable that
borrowers expect the market to judge them more harshly if they have been given a bad
rating than if they have none. In the absence of bad news they could expect the lenders
to have some uncertainty about their credit standing, which is even more likely to happen
in the case where more types could be mistaken for one another. As unrated countries are
a pool of different borrowers that do not access the rating services, being unrated could be
perceived to be better than having a low rating.9
The timing is the following:
8Ancillary services can play several roles: for instance, reducing the uncertainty about the outcome of
the rating process for the borrowers or improving the transmission of information between the borrower and
the rating agency. On top of that, confidentiality is an essential element of some of these services that are
recently provided by the CRAs.
9As a matter of fact, there is a small but growing number of borrowers which decide to issue debt in
the international debt market without a rating. They have accounted for about 10 per cent of the European
corporate bond market in recent years and usually they could be classified as investment, or near-investment
grade (Bolger and Wigglesworth, 2014).
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1. In stage t = 0, the borrower decides whether to buy ancillary services at cost χ. Denote
this decision by a ∈ {0, 1}.
2. If the borrower is a client of ancillary services, in stage t = 1, it receives a non-binding
assessment about the rating grade, which can be m = h or m = l. In stage t = 2,
borrowers choose whether to solicit and pay the fee φ(D, γ) for a rating: s = {0, 1}.
Denote as g = 0 the case in which the borrower remains unrated.
3. If the borrower is not a client of ancillary services, in stage t = 1, the rating agency
may issue an unsolicited rating. γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of unsolicited ratings
issued. After deciding to issue an unsolicited rating, the signal σ = {H,L} is received.
In stage t = 2, borrowers that did not receive an unsolicited rating have the option
to solicit one, s = {0, 1}. Note that a borrower cannot have both a solicited and
unsolicited rating.
The lenders observe the choices of the borrower and those of the rating agency, except for
the existence of ancillary services, which is kept confidential between the borrower and the
CRA. To sum up, the borrower can have a rating, g = H or g = L, or none, g = 0. Ratings
can be either solicited or unsolicited but not both of them.
2.3.2 CRA problem
The CRA takes two actions: in t = 1 it decides the fraction γ of unsolicited rating to non-
clients of ancillary services10 and, in t = 2, it issues a solicited rating if it has been asked for
one. The truth-telling assumption implies that the grade report will be either the signal the
CRA received or none. Denote the rating grade report g(a, u, s, σ), where the first element
corresponds to the choice of ancillary services, the second represents the existence of an
unsolicited rating, the third of a solicited one and the last element is the signal about the
creditworthiness of the borrower available to the CRA. Depending on those elements, the
rule for assigning a rating grade is the following:
g∗(1, 0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(1, 0, 0, σ) = 0, (2.3.1)
g∗(0, 0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(0, 1, 0, σ) = σ (2.3.2)
and g∗(0, 0, 0, σ) = 0. (2.3.3)
When the borrower is a client of ancillary services, a = 1, it may request a rating or not, in
which case it won’t receive an unsolicited one. If the borrower is not a client, a = 0, it may
10Recall that clients of ancillary services do not receive unsolicited ratings.
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request a rating and, if not, it may receive on unsolicited one or it may also be unrated.
In t = 1 the CRA problem is the following:
max
γ
−γc+ [(1− γ)f ∗(γ) (φ(D, γ)− c)] , (2.3.4)
where f ∗(γ) is the fraction of borrowers that solicit a rating in equilibrium. The CRA chooses
the proportion of unsolicited ratings taking into account that each rating has a cost c today
and it also has an effect in the next stage: on the one hand, it crowds out solicited ratings,
as a borrower cannot have both a solicited and unsolicited rating, hence only 1−γ borrowers
are susceptible to solicit a rating afterwards; on the other hand, it increases the fees that
can be charged for those solicited ratings. Therefore, γ∗ is, as well, the probability that a
non-client of ancillary services gets an unsolicited rating.
2.3.3 Lenders’ problem
Lenders lend the amount qD to the borrower and receive D at the end of the game if there
is no default. In case of default, there is no partial repayment. The lender profit function is:
Π = −qD + β [µλAD + (1− µ)λBD] , (2.3.5)
where µ = µ(s, g) are the lenders’ beliefs that the borrower is of type A. Beliefs depend
on what the lender observes about the borrowers creditworthiness: the solicitation statute
and the rating grade. As a result of imposing the zero-profit condition, the price function
satisfies:
q(µ) = β[µλA + (1− µ)λB]. (2.3.6)
The value µ(0, 0) represents the lenders’ beliefs when they see no rating for some borrower,
µ(0, H) and µ(0, L) the lenders see an unsolicited rating of H or L, respectively.
2.3.4 Borrower’s problem
The borrower faces two problems: whether to buy ancillary services at t = 0 and whether
to solicit a rating at t = 2. The borrower’s payoff, depending on its rating, is the following:
• If the borrower buys ancillary services and it also solicits a rating: q(µ)D + λi(R −
D) + (1 − λi)r − φ(D, γ) − χ, where the first term is the amount of borrowing at
price q(µ) = q(1, g), the second and third terms are the net revenues weighted by the
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repayment probabilities and the last two terms are the fee for solicitation and ancillary
services, respectively.
• If the borrower solicits a rating but does not buy ancillary services, it saves on the
amount of ancillary fees: q(1, g)D + λi(R−D) + (1− λi)r − φ(D, γ).
• A borrower that does not buy ancillary services may receive an unsolicited rating with
an associated payoff of q(0, g)D + λi(R − D) + (1 − λi)r, where the price of debt is
q(0, g) and the borrower does not incur in any fees.
• Finally, if the borrower is unrated the payoff equals q(0, 0)D + λi(R −D) + (1− λi)r
if it did not buy ancillary services or q(0, 0)D + λi(R−D) + (1− λi)r − χ if it did.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
I solve using the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Definition 2.3.1. Given the CRA rule of g∗(a, u, s, σ), a symmetric equilibrium is a γ∗, a
strategy for the borrower:
{a∗, s∗} : {A,B} → {0, 1} × {0, 1}, (2.3.7)
where a∗(i) is the choice of ancillary services and s∗ (i, a(i)) is the rating solicitation, a
strategy for the lender about the debt price q∗(s, g) : {0, 1} × {H,L, 0} → R+ and a system
of beliefs µ∗(s, g) : {0, 1} × {H,L, 0} → [0, 1] about the borrower being type A, such that:
• γ∗ maximises the CRA profit function (2.3.4) and f ∗(γ) is consistent with the bor-
rower’s strategy.
• The strategy profile is sequentially rational given the beliefs and γ∗.
• The beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
2.3.6 Model without ancillary services
Let us first solve the model without ancillary services as a benchmark. The game starts at
t = 1. All the other modeling assumptions stay the same.
Proposition 2.3.1. A rule of g∗(u, s, σ): g∗(0, 1, σ) = σ, g∗(1, 0, σ) = σ and g∗(0, 0, σ) = 0,
the strategies s∗(A) = 1, s∗(B) = 0, q∗(µ) = µλA + (1 − µ)λB and γ∗ = (1−θ)c+θα1−2θα2D + 12
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constitute an equilibrium of the model without ancillary services given the following beliefs
µ(s, g): µ(s, L) = 0∀ s, µ(1, H) = 1,
µ(0, H) =
1 w. prob. θθ+(1−θ)p0 w. prob. (1−θ)p
θ+(1−θ)p
and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
θξ
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1)) .
The CRA assigns a proportion γ∗ of unsolicited ratings to both type A and type B
borrowers in order to maximise its profit function (2.3.4) in t = 1:
max
γ
−γc+ (1− γ)θ [φ(D, γ)− c] .
Substituting the functional form of φ(D, γ) and solving the maximization problem, we obtain
the first order condition:
−c− θ(α1 + α2γD) + θ(1− γ)α2D + θc = 0.
Rearranging we find an expression for the optimal fraction of unsolicited ratings that the
CRA issues:
γ∗ =
(1− θ)c+ θα1
−2θα2D +
1
2
. (2.3.8)
Since γ′(D) > 0 if α1 > c, γ∗ is increasing in the amount of debt.
For condition φ > φ > φ¯11 type A prefers to solicit a rating rather than remaining
unrated, if they are not given an unsolicited one, while type B does not. Conditions state
that φ in equilibrium has to stay within some upper and lower bounds: the bounds depend
on D, γ∗, θ, λA and λB. A fee too high would discourage even the best borrowers to ask for
a rating.
Type A can have either a solicited or unsolicited H rating and a fraction ξ is unrated
by assumption. If type A were allowed to solicit a rating after an unsolicited one they may
choose to do so. The reason is the price of debt is better for solicited ratings for the same
H grade. We simplify away from this possibility but this behaviour is something we might
observe. Type B can have an H unsolicited rating, L unsolicited rating or no rating. There
11See Appendix 2.5.3 for a proof.
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are no grade L solicited ratings. Thus, unsolicited ratings have lower grades on average.
Type A knows that it is more likely to receive an H rating, so it has an incentive to pay
the fee for a solicited rating. Type B, on the contrary, has a lower probability p to receive an
H rating and a high probability to receive an L rating, which bears a higher risk premium
than an absence of rating. The fact that higher quality borrowers are more inclined to get
rated is a well-known result in the literature (Lizzeri, 1999; Mathis et al., 2009; Fulghieri
et al., 2014).
2.3.7 Introducing ancillary services
Proposition 2.3.2. For g∗(a, u, s, σ) given by equations (2.3.1)-(2.3.3), the strategies a∗(A) =
0, a∗(B) = 1, s∗(A, 0) = 1, s∗(B, 0) = 0, s∗(A, 1) = 1, s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l,
q∗(µ) = µλA + (1− µ)λB and γ∗ that solves problem (2.3.4) constitute an equilibrium of the
model given the following beliefs: µ(0, H) = 1, µ(0, L) = 0, µ(1, L) = 0,
µ(1, H) =
1 w. prob.
2θ(1−γ)
2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(p+)
2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)
and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
2θξ
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(ξ+1)
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
if γ > γ¯.
The CRA assigns a proportion γ∗ of unsolicited H ratings to type A borrowers. Type B
borrowers enter a contract of ancillary services and avoid receiving unsolicited ratings. They
can either have a solicited H or L rating, after having observed the assessment m = h, or no
rating, after having observed the assessment m = l. A fraction ξ of borrowers is unrated by
assumption. Type A borrowers who are neither unrated nor received an unsolicited rating,
solicit and receive an H rating. There are no grade L unsolicited ratings, as the type B
borrowers that would be subject to receiving one prefer to pay for ancillary services and veto
that possibility. Hence, unsolicited ratings have higher grades on average. There are two
thresholds values φ¯ and φ12 such that: for φ > φ and φ < φ¯, s∗(A, a) = 1 ∀a and s∗(B, 0) = 0,
s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l.
12The thresholds depend on the parameters of the model and a formal derivation can be found in ap-
pendix 2.5.4.
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Type A prefers to solicit a rating whenever φ < φ¯, whether they are clients of ancillary
services or not. Their incentives to solicit are high, because the probability of getting a high
rating is large, as long as the price of ratings is sufficiently low. Type B, on the contrary,
prefers not to solicit a rating unless they are given a strong signal, a positive assessment, that
the rating will be high. That is, if the fees are high enough with respect to the probability
p of being given an H rating.
The CRA problem (2.3.4) can be rewritten in the following way:
max
γ
−γc+ (1− γ)θ [φ(D, γ)− c] + 1
2
(1− θ) [φ(D, γ)− c] . (2.3.9)
Plugging in the functional form of φ(D, γ) and solving for γ:
γ∗ =
(1− θ)c+ θα1
−2θα2D +
1
2
(
1
2
+
1
2θ
)
, (2.3.10)
where the first two terms coincide with the expression for the optimal fraction of unsolicited
ratings in the model without ancillary services and the term in parenthesis, which is > 1 for
0 > θ > 1, represents the additional incentive to issue unsolicited ratings due to the gains
coming from the clients of ancillary services.
For a∗(B) = 1,
Proposition 2.3.3. Provided γ is high enough, type B prefers to buy ancillary services for
a fee χ and obtain a rating H with probability p and no rating g = 0 with probability 1 − p
than risk getting an unsolicited H rating with probability γp and L with probability γ(1− p).
The existence of this equilibrium depends on the value of γ:
γ > γ¯ :=
βG(θ, ξ, λA, λB) +
α1
2
+ χ
2βG(θ, ξ, λA, λB)− α2D . (2.3.11)
where G(θ, ξ, λA, λB) =
2θξλA+(1−θ)(ξ+1)λB
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1) . Note that a
∗(A) = 0 is always true13. If type
A does not ask for ancillary services it might get an unsolicited H rating or a solicited H
rating. With ancillary services the outcome is always a solicited H rating but at the extra
cost of having to pay the fee χ.
In this set-up, unsolicited H ratings are assigned only to A types, therefore they are fully
revealing of the high quality type. This confirms equilibrium beliefs in proposition 2.3.2.
Off-equilibrium beliefs µ(0, L) are set equal to 0.
13For a∗(A) = 0: γq(0, H)D+(1−γ) [q(1, H)D − φ(γ,D)] > 12q(1, H)D+ 12q(1, H)D−φ(γ,D)−χ. Since
q(0, H) > q(1, H), the statement is always true.
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Since unsolicited H ratings are assigned only to A types but solicited H ratings can be
assigned to A and B types, we expect to see a market premium in the price of debt of high
unsolicited ratings with respect to solicited.
Note that γ is a choice of the rating agency that is described by the expression (2.3.10).
When γ is low, type B does not choose ancillary services and the equilibrium outcome is
similar to the one described in the solution to the model without ancillary services.
Proposition 2.3.4. For g∗(a, u, s, σ) given by equations (2.3.1)-(2.3.3), the strategies a∗(A) =
0, a∗(B) = 0, s∗(A, 0) = 1, s∗(B, 0) = 0, s∗(A, 1) = 1, s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h and 0 if m = l,
q∗(µ) = µλA + (1− µ)λB and γ∗ that solves problem (2.3.4) constitute an equilibrium of the
model given the following beliefs: µ(s, g): µ(s, L) = 0∀ s, µ(1, H) = 1,
µ(0, H) =
1 w. prob. θθ+(1−θ)p0 w. prob. (1−θ)p
θ+(1−θ)p
and
µ(0, 0) =
1 w. prob.
θξ
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
0 w. prob. (1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ(ξ−1))
if γ ≤ γ¯.
Thus, all grade H solicited ratings are assigned to type A borrowers whereas grade
H unsolicited ratings can be given to type A or B with different probabilities. Grade L
unsolicited ratings are assigned to type B borrowers. Finally, unrated borrowers can be
either type A or B. This confirms equilibrium beliefs in proposition 2.3.4. Off-equilibrium
beliefs µ(1, L) are free to be [0, 1], in this case, they are equal to 0.
2.3.8 Comparative statics
Some parameters affect the determination of the equilibrium.
• The amount of debt issued by a given borrower category or in a given market segment
(D). D affects the fraction of borrowers susceptible to receive an unsolicited rating:
since γ′(D) > 0, the higher the amount of debt in a given market or whenever the
borrowers issue more debt, the more incentives the CRA has to assign unsolicited
ratings. This is because the benefits from increased fees in the future - due to the
high debt - more than compensate for the costs of issuing unsolicitedly. The CRA has
70
incentives to increase their revenues when those are the largest, as it is the case when
there is a lot of debt to intermediate.
Suppose there are two equilibrium probabilities of issuing an unsolicited rating, γ∗1
and γ∗2 , where γ
∗
1 < γ¯ < γ
∗
2 . Recall that γ¯ is the threshold of γ that makes type B
want to buy ancillary services as defined in equation (2.3.11). An increase from γ∗1
to γ∗2 makes type B willing to buy ancillary services in order to avoid a more likely
unsolicited rating. Therefore, the equilibrium changes from one without equilibrium
ancillary services and lower grades unsolicited ratings to one with equilibrium ancillary
services and higher grades unsolicited ratings.
• The ex-ante market perception about the creditworthiness of a borrower (θ). θ affects
the conditions on the maximum and minimum levels of φ that allow to sustain a given
equilibrium. A higher θ provides more incentives for B to ask for ancillary services but
also more incentives for A to solicit a rating since both q(0, 0) and q(1, H) increase but
q(0, H) does not change. Hence, it favours the equilibrium with ancillary services. On
the contrary, a lower θ favours the equilibrium without ancillary services because the
worsening of the unrated pool makes it less attractive to be a part of it.
• The parameters governing the fixed part (α1) and the variable part (α2) of the CRA’s
rating fees.
γ′(α2) > 0, hence, an increase in α2 makes γ higher and it is more likely that there is
an equilibrium with ancillary services. α2 captures the steepness in which unsolicited
ratings allow you to charge more fees per unit of debt. Hence, it works very similarly
to an increase in γ:
φ(α1, α2, D, γ) = α1 + α2γD. (2.3.12)
α2 can be interpreted as the bargaining power or the market share of the CRA. If
they are in a better position to extract more fees per unit of debt in one market; it is
reasonable that they want to take advantage of that by increasing their presence and
maximising revenues.
α1 is the fixed part of the CRA compensation, irrespective of debt and market position.
You can think of it as the minimum amount they require to rate a borrower no matter
what the circumstances. It might not compensate the CRA to issue a rating if they
are paid below a certain compensation. Condition (2.3.8) tells us that α1 has to be
higher than the cost of issuing a rating for γ′(D) > 0. I.e. the fixed part of the rating
fees has to compensate for the fixed costs of issuing a rating.
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Figure 2.6: Percentage of solicited and unsolicited ratings.
2.3.9 Relationship with the data
Higher average debt and high α2 give incentives to the CRA to assign more unsolicited
ratings. In the equilibrium with ancillary services, the proportion of unsolicited ratings, γ∗,
is higher, hence, the percentage of type A borrowers that get an unsolicited rating is higher.
Moreover, the percentage of unsolicited ratings over total ratings, θγ
θ+(1−θ 1
2
)
is higher than
in the equilibrium with unsolicited ratings, γ
θ+(1−θ)γ , as long as there is not a large number
of type B firms: γ < θ(1−θ)
2(1−θ−θ2) . We have seen that unsolicited ratings are frequent among
sovereign ratings and they are mostly high rating grades (stylised facts 2.1 and 2.2).
The equilibrium with a higher probability of unsolicited ratings features higher unsolicited
rating grades thanks to the opt out option provided by ancillary services (see figure 2.6).
In the equilibrium without ancillary services (low probability of unsolicited ratings γ∗),
unsolicited ratings are g = H and g = L (shaded areas) while in the equilibrium with
ancillary services (with high probability of unsolicited ratings γ∗) they are g = H. Hence,
in the latter equilibrium unsolicited ratings are higher on average than solicited ones. But
this is not necessarily true for the other equilibrium. This explains δ > 0 in the regression
of sovereign rating grades on solicitation status (table 2.4).14
Conditional on the rating, unsolicited ratings are associated with higher or lower yields
depending on the equilibrium. In the equilibrium with ancillary services, q(0, H)−q(1, H) >
0 and q(0, L)−q(1, L) = 0, hence, unsolicited ratings are associated with lower yields whereas
in the equilibrium without, q(0, H)−q(1, H) < 0 and q(0, L)−q(1, L) = 0, they are associated
with higher yields. High unsolicited ratings are associated with a higher q(0, H) because they
reveal a type A perfectly (type B chooses to buy ancillary services). This result is in line
with δ < 0 in the regression of sovereign yields on solicitation status (table 2.6).
14This effect would disappear if we could control perfectly for the type, which we assume we cannot do
here since it is private information.
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2.4 Conclusion
To what extent rating agencies strategically downgrade their unsolicited ratings? The answer
to this question is relevant for policy because it matters to determine if the rating agencies
may have misbehaved. In this paper I propose a model that assumes away strategic moti-
vations for unsolicited ratings by assuming true-telling on the part of the CRA. The degree
of market selection in equilibrium depends on the market size and other market characteris-
tics. The model is, hence, able to explain both the downward bias in unsolicited ratings for
certain categories of borrowers (banks, insurance, corporates) as well as the upward bias for
sovereign borrowers.
The equilibrium with positive selection on unsolicited ratings is generated thanks to
the possibility to enter a private contract with the CRA with a confidentiality clause (e.g.
ancillary services). This also allows us to explore in which circumstances the value of opacity
for some borrowers can be marketed by the CRAs. When the rating agencies cater to both
the borrowers that have incentives to be transparent as well as those that prefer opacity,
they still provide the market with valuable information but the amount of information might
be biased towards a particular group of borrowers.
An extended version of the model presented in this paper, properly calibrated, could
be able to deliver a useful benchmark for the downward natural bias as a function of the
characteristics of the market under study. Identifying the “natural size” of the market
selection bias would help to detect the presence of strategic motivation and, hence, inform
policy intervention.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Probit models for years 2010 - 2015
Probit models for the probability of having an unsolicited rating given the rating grade, the
level of debt over GDP, GDPpc and regional fixed effects for each year between 2010 and
2015.
Table 2.7: Probit model
Unsolicited rating
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Rating grade 0.430 0.397* 0.185** 0.162** 0.174** 0.146*
(0.287) (0.204) (0.0809) (0.0759) (0.0815) (0.0768)
Debt 0.0411* 0.0491** 0.0312** 0.0267** 0.0270** 0.0212**
(0.0226) (0.0241) (0.0139) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.00931)
GDPpc 0.0000414 0.0000453* 0.0000116 0.00000924 0.0000112 0.00000978
(0.0000258) (0.0000267) (0.0000186) (0.0000166) (0.0000177) (0.0000154)
Geographic dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 93 95 99 104 107 120
r2 p 0.593 0.634 0.481 0.445 0.430 0.357
chi2 32.37 34.82 29.04 31.26 30.48 26.28
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.5.2 List of sovereigns rated unsolicitedly and comparable sovereigns
Unsolicited Solicited
2010
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa1
Italy Aa2 Norway Aaa
Luxembourg Aaa
Mauritius Baa2
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
2011
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa1
Italy Aa3
Luxembourg Aaa
Mauritius Baa2
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
2012
France Aaa Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa1 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 South Africa A3
Mauritius Baa1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
United Kingdom Aaa
Zambia B1
2013
France Aa1 Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa2 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 Ghana B1
Mauritius Baa1 South Africa Baa1
Mozambique B1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
2014
France Aa1 Austria Aaa
Germany Aaa Belgium Aa3
Italy Baa2 Botswana A2
Kenya B1 Ghana B2
Mauritius Baa1 South Africa Baa1
Mozambique B1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
2015
Bahrain Baa3 Austria Aaa
France Aa1 Belgium Aa3
Germany Aaa Botswana A2
Italy Baa2 South Africa Baa2
Kenya B1
Mauritius Baa1
Netherlands Aaa
Switzerland Aaa
Uganda B1
United Kingdom Aa1
Zambia B1
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2.5.3 Equilibrium conditions in the model without ancillary ser-
vices
According to the beliefs, the lenders’ price function is the following:
q(s, σ) =

q(0, 0) = β
[
θξλA+(1−θ)(1+γ∗(ξ−1))λB
θξ+(1−θ)(1+γ∗(ξ−1))
]
q(0, H) = β
[
θλA+(1−θ)pλB
θ+(1−θ)p
]
q(0, L) = βλB
q(1, H) = βλA
q(1, L) = βλB.
(2.5.1)
The condition for s∗(A) = 1 is q(1, H)D+λA(R−D) + (1−λA)r−φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+
λA(R − D) + (1 − λA)r, that is, the payoff for soliciting and obtaining a rating H with
probability 1 for a fee φ(D, γ) is higher than the payoff of remaining without a rating.
Substituting the expressions for q(·) from (2.5.1), we obtain:
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[(
1− θξ
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λA − (1− θ) (1 + γ
∗(ξ − 1))
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))λB
]
D.
On the other hand, for s∗(B) = 0, paying the fee to solicit a rating, which is H with a prob-
ability p and L with a probability 1−p, is not worth for type B: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−
λB)r > p [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+(1−p) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]−
φ(D, γ). Substituting and rearranging, we obtain the following condition:
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[(
p− θξ
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λA +
(
(1− p)− (1− θ) (1 + γ
∗(ξ − 1))
θξ + (1− θ) (1 + γ∗(ξ − 1))
)
λB
]
D
The two conditions verify the proposed equilibrium choices s∗(A) = 1 and s∗(B) = 0.
This confirms the beliefs in equilibrium and off-equilibrium beliefs µ(1, L) are free to be set
arbitrarily.
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2.5.4 Equilibrium conditions in the model with ancillary services
According to the beliefs, the lenders’ price function is the following:
q(s, g) =

q(0, 0) = β
[
2θξλA+(1−θ)(ξ+1)λB
2θξ+(1−θ)(ξ+1)
]
q(0, H) = βλA
q(0, L) = βλB
q(1, H) = β
[
2θ(1−ξ)(1−γ)λA+(1−θ)(1−ξ)(p+)λB
(1−ξ)[2θ(1−γ)+(1−θ)(p+)]
]
q(1, L) = βλB.
(2.5.2)
The condition for s∗(A, 0) = 1, under such beliefs, is the following: q(1, H)D + λA(R −
D) + (1− λA)r− φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r. Substituting the expressions
for q(·) from (2.5.2), we obtain:
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] −
2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D.
(2.5.3)
The condition above is the same to guarantee s∗(A, 1) = 1, no matter whether the assessment
is m = h or m = l. Moreover, the condition for s∗(B, 1) = 1 if m = h is: (p+ )q(1, H)D +
(1− p− )q(1, L)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r− φ(D, γ) > q(0, 0)D+ λA(R−D) + (1− λA)r.
Thus,
φ(D, γ∗) < β
[
(p+ )
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p− )λB−
(2.5.4)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D := φ¯.
Since λB < λA, condition (2.5.4) is more restrictive than condition (2.5.3). If type B wants
to solicit a rating after an assessment m = h, then type A wants to solicit a rating as well.
On the other hand, for s∗(B, 0) = 0, paying the fee to solicit a rating, which is H with a
probability p and L with a probability 1−p, is not worth for type B: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−
λB)r > p [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+(1−p) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]−
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φ(D, γ). Substituting and rearranging, we obtain the following condition:
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[
p
2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p)λB− (2.5.5)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D.
And, if they receive a negative assessment m = l, type B prefers again not to solicit a rating
s∗(B, 1) = 0: q(0, 0)D+λB(R−D)+(1−λB)r > (p−) [q(1, H)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]+
(1− p+ ) [q(1, L)D + λB(R−D) + (1− λB)r]− φ(D, γ). Thus,
φ(D, γ∗) > β
[
(p− )2θ(1− ξ)(1− γ
∗)λA + (1− θ)(1− ξ)(p+ )λB
(1− ξ) [2θ(1− γ∗) + (1− θ)(p+ )] + (1− p+ )λB−
(2.5.6)
−2θξλA + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)λB
2θξ + (1− θ)(ξ + 1)
]
D := φ.
Since  > 0, if θ(D, γ∗) satisfies condition (2.5.5) it also satisfies (2.5.6) .
Conditions (2.5.4) and (2.5.5) verify the proposed equilibrium choices. These choices
confirm the equilibrium beliefs.
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